Os fundamentos ontológicos do dasein: existência, mundo e temporalidade

• Autor(a) principal: Guimarães, Danilo Moreira
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo (riUfes)
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/3686
• topic: Dasein; Ser-no-mundo; Mundo; Temporalidade; Sujeito-objeto; Filosofia; 101

According to Heidegger, the Dasein’s fundamental way of beinf is the Being-inthe-world. Aplltying this concept, Hedidegger intends not show what, but how is the Dasein’s existencial dynamics. In that sense, Being and Time distinguishes the Being-in-the-world in three different fundamental structures: worldhood, Being-with nad Being-in. Each of these strucutres aim to disclose the whole of this phenomenon. Thus, in spite of distinguishing the Being-in-the-world in three apparently diverse structures, it is important to underline that Heidegger understands it as a unity. The matter of the world is developed in Being and Time in the third chapter of the first section, this section is reserved to interpret the Dasein in its reference to temporality and desings an explation of time as a transcendental horizon for the quest of the Being. Heidegger aims, when he asks what the world is, to reach the world’s essence, which, for Heidegger means to analyze the wolrdhood’s ontolological-phenomenological concept (weltlichkeit). In Heidegger’s account, the wolrdhood of he world is an existencial of Dasein. Then, from the existencial analitics’ ontology develepoed in Being and Time, the world is not a determination of a being that the Dasein in its essence is not. The World is a Dasein’s proper character. With an analyzes of the concept of the world as an existencial of Dasein, Heidegger means to desconstruct the idea of subject and world as substances, res cogitans and res extensa, concpets vastly used by the modern tradition of philosophy, especially by Descartes and, having it im mind, Heidegger shows how insufficient the modern dualism subject-object is. Dasein and World, in Heidegger’s view, are not two distinct beings in themselves, that is to say, the relation between Dasein and world ought not to be thought as if Dasein were a being and world another being. The schism with the modern thought only happens when Heidegger develops, in Being and Time, his conception of temporality [Zeitlichkeit].