A legitimidade pós-metafísica dos direitos humanos em Jürgen Habermas

• Autor(a) principal: Lourete, Suzana de Alvarenga
• Data de Publicação: 2018
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo (riUfes)
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/10169
• topic: Teoria do discurso; Direitos humanos; Legitimidade; Pós-metafísica; Filosofia; Autenticidade (Filosofia); Metafísica; 101

This work analyses Human Rights within Jürgen Habermas' political philosophy, from a postmethaphysical arguition of Moral and Law, as well as their legitimacy in democratic, multicultural and plural societies, as a way of social integration. The first chapter explores Habermas' understanding of the methaphysical thinking as well as his critics to this paradigm, often centered in the Kantianism, to the norms in contemporary democratic societies. Thus, it is analysed how the Frankfurt philosopher engenders his theory of rationality, initially with elements of his Theory of Communicative Action and, in sequence, with the introduction of procedure ruler principles of his Discursive Theory, to know, Principle of Universalization (‘U’) and Principle of Discourse (‘D’). This explanation leads to the conclusion how the postmethaphysical ethics will ground moral and legal norms. The second chapter analyses the habermasian approach to the nexus between the postconventional moral and the discourse ethics, leading to understand the relation between this Moral and the Law. The Principle of Discourse assumes, by the juridical institutionalization, the figure of the Principle of Democracy, which ensures legitimador power to the procedural legalization. The Principle of Democracy results, according to Habermas, by the interaction of the Principle of Discourse and the legal form, which is constituted by the subjective liberty of action and by the coercive force, stabilizing the social expectations of acting. The chapter finishes with Apel's criticism to the moral neutrality of the Principle of Discourse thesis and Habermas' replics advocating his theory of a complementary relation between moral and law. The third chapter explains the role of Human Rights in the habemasian practical and legal philosophy. The first part shows how Habermas understands the internal nexus between Human Rights and people’s sovereignty, which, by the opposite of de liberal and republican traditions, must not be polarized, because they are premises to a reciprocal cooriginal existence. From this cooriginality begins, or the “logical genesis”, a range of fundamental rights to the democratic States’ constitutions. Finally, this work sustains the role of mediator of human dignity as the postmethaphysical universal moral source of Human Rights, before the primacy of the justice over the good.