Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Harris, Jean E.
Data de Publicação: 2012
Outros Autores: Cunningham, Gary M.
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Sistemas & Gestão
Texto Completo: https://www.revistasg.uff.br/sg/article/view/V6N2A1
Resumo: This paper reviews the traditional incentive model of reporting corporate social responsibility (CSR), a complementary disincentive model is introduced, and the two are compared. Both models are grounded in the assumption that reporting increases the supply of information to inform providers of capital and, being informed, providers respond. The traditional model assumes an incentive response, i.e. the capital is provided and the cost of capital is beneficial to the company. By contrast, and the emerging model assumes a disincentive response, information motivates potential debt or equity investors to withhold capital. The emerging disincentive model is seen in the coal mining industry of the U.S. through (a)  derivative lawsuits by shareholders to obtain safety and environmental information about corporate actions, (b) banking policies that restrict credit for mountaintop removal coal mining (MTRM), and (c) regulatory provisions e.g. Dodd-Frank Act requiring financial statement disclosure of  health and safety mining health and safety standards. Also, the disincentive model is advanced through technology (a) in collection, aggregation, and disclosure of information and (b) investment funds that exclude socially irresponsible companies.  The emerging CSR disincentive reporting model (a) addresses core accountability aspects reporting compliance failures with laws and regulations and (b) incorporates beneficial accounting and auditing attributes. Implications for further research are presented.
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spelling Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the IrresponsibleContrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the IrresponsibleContrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the IrresponsibleAccountingCorporate Social ResponsibilityCorporate Social Responsibility ReportingAccountingCorporate Social ResponsibilityCorporate Social Responsibility ReportingThis paper reviews the traditional incentive model of reporting corporate social responsibility (CSR), a complementary disincentive model is introduced, and the two are compared. Both models are grounded in the assumption that reporting increases the supply of information to inform providers of capital and, being informed, providers respond. The traditional model assumes an incentive response, i.e. the capital is provided and the cost of capital is beneficial to the company. By contrast, and the emerging model assumes a disincentive response, information motivates potential debt or equity investors to withhold capital. The emerging disincentive model is seen in the coal mining industry of the U.S. through (a)  derivative lawsuits by shareholders to obtain safety and environmental information about corporate actions, (b) banking policies that restrict credit for mountaintop removal coal mining (MTRM), and (c) regulatory provisions e.g. Dodd-Frank Act requiring financial statement disclosure of  health and safety mining health and safety standards. Also, the disincentive model is advanced through technology (a) in collection, aggregation, and disclosure of information and (b) investment funds that exclude socially irresponsible companies.  The emerging CSR disincentive reporting model (a) addresses core accountability aspects reporting compliance failures with laws and regulations and (b) incorporates beneficial accounting and auditing attributes. Implications for further research are presented.This paper reviews the traditional incentive model of reporting corporate social responsibility (CSR), a complementary disincentive model is introduced, and the two are compared. Both models are grounded in the assumption that reporting increases the supply of information to inform providers of capital and, being informed, providers respond. The traditional model assumes an incentive response, i.e. the capital is provided and the cost of capital is beneficial to the company. By contrast, and the emerging model assumes a disincentive response, information motivates potential debt or equity investors to withhold capital. The emerging disincentive model is seen in the coal mining industry of the U.S. through (a)  derivative lawsuits by shareholders to obtain safety and environmental information about corporate actions, (b) banking policies that restrict credit for mountaintop removal coal mining (MTRM), and (c) regulatory provisions e.g. Dodd-Frank Act requiring financial statement disclosure of  health and safety mining health and safety standards. Also, the disincentive model is advanced through technology (a) in collection, aggregation, and disclosure of information and (b) investment funds that exclude socially irresponsible companies.  The emerging CSR disincentive reporting model (a) addresses core accountability aspects reporting compliance failures with laws and regulations and (b) incorporates beneficial accounting and auditing attributes. Implications for further research are presented.This paper reviews the traditional incentive model of reporting corporate social responsibility (CSR),a complementary disincentive model is introduced, and the two are compared. Both models are groundedin the assumption that reporting increases the supply of information to inform providers of capital and,being informed, providers respond. The traditional model assumes an incentive response, i.e. the capital isprovided and the cost of capital is beneficial to the company. By contrast, and the emerging model assumesa disincentive response, information motivates potential debt or equity investors to withhold capital.The emerging disincentive model is seen in the coal mining industry of the U.S. through (a) derivative lawsuitsby shareholders to obtain safety and environmental information about corporate actions, (b) banking policiesthat restrict credit for mountaintop removal coal mining (MTRM), and (c) regulatory provisions e.g. Dodd-FrankAct requiring financial statement disclosure of health and safety mining health and safety standards. Also, thedisincentive model is advanced through technology (a) in collection, aggregation, and disclosure of informationand (b) investment funds that exclude socially irresponsible companies. The emerging CSR disincentive reportingmodel (a) addresses core accountability aspects reporting compliance failures with laws and regulations and(b) incorporates beneficial accounting and auditing attributes. Implications for further research are presented.ABEC2012-03-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.revistasg.uff.br/sg/article/view/V6N2A110.7177/sg.2011.V6.N2.A1Sistemas & Gestão; v. 6 n. 2 (2011): Agosto/2011; 76-901980-516010.7177/sg.2011.v6.n2reponame:Sistemas & Gestãoinstname:Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)instacron:UFFporhttps://www.revistasg.uff.br/sg/article/view/V6N2A1/V6N2A1_Copyright (c) 2015 Sistemas & Gestãoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHarris, Jean E.Cunningham, Gary M.2023-01-09T18:18:58Zoai:ojs.www.revistasg.uff.br:article/302Revistahttps://www.revistasg.uff.br/sgPUBhttps://www.revistasg.uff.br/sg/oai||sg.revista@gmail.com|| periodicos@proppi.uff.br1980-51601980-5160opendoar:2023-01-09T18:18:58Sistemas & Gestão - Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
title Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
spellingShingle Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
Harris, Jean E.
Accounting
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
Accounting
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
title_short Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
title_full Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
title_fullStr Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
title_full_unstemmed Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
title_sort Contrasting Two Models for Reporting Corporate Social Activities: Encouraging the Responsible and Discouraging the Irresponsible
author Harris, Jean E.
author_facet Harris, Jean E.
Cunningham, Gary M.
author_role author
author2 Cunningham, Gary M.
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Harris, Jean E.
Cunningham, Gary M.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Accounting
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
Accounting
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
topic Accounting
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
Accounting
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
description This paper reviews the traditional incentive model of reporting corporate social responsibility (CSR), a complementary disincentive model is introduced, and the two are compared. Both models are grounded in the assumption that reporting increases the supply of information to inform providers of capital and, being informed, providers respond. The traditional model assumes an incentive response, i.e. the capital is provided and the cost of capital is beneficial to the company. By contrast, and the emerging model assumes a disincentive response, information motivates potential debt or equity investors to withhold capital. The emerging disincentive model is seen in the coal mining industry of the U.S. through (a)  derivative lawsuits by shareholders to obtain safety and environmental information about corporate actions, (b) banking policies that restrict credit for mountaintop removal coal mining (MTRM), and (c) regulatory provisions e.g. Dodd-Frank Act requiring financial statement disclosure of  health and safety mining health and safety standards. Also, the disincentive model is advanced through technology (a) in collection, aggregation, and disclosure of information and (b) investment funds that exclude socially irresponsible companies.  The emerging CSR disincentive reporting model (a) addresses core accountability aspects reporting compliance failures with laws and regulations and (b) incorporates beneficial accounting and auditing attributes. Implications for further research are presented.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-03-21
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.revistasg.uff.br/sg/article/view/V6N2A1
10.7177/sg.2011.V6.N2.A1
url https://www.revistasg.uff.br/sg/article/view/V6N2A1
identifier_str_mv 10.7177/sg.2011.V6.N2.A1
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.revistasg.uff.br/sg/article/view/V6N2A1/V6N2A1_
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2015 Sistemas & Gestão
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2015 Sistemas & Gestão
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv ABEC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv ABEC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Sistemas & Gestão; v. 6 n. 2 (2011): Agosto/2011; 76-90
1980-5160
10.7177/sg.2011.v6.n2
reponame:Sistemas & Gestão
instname:Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)
instacron:UFF
instname_str Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)
instacron_str UFF
institution UFF
reponame_str Sistemas & Gestão
collection Sistemas & Gestão
repository.name.fl_str_mv Sistemas & Gestão - Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||sg.revista@gmail.com|| periodicos@proppi.uff.br
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