Nietzsche com e contra Kant: uma investigação sobre os conceitos de natureza, representação e erro em Humano demasiado humano

• Autor(a) principal: Neves, Arthur Brito
• Data de Publicação: 2021
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFG
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/11507
• topic: Nietzsche; Kant; Natureza; Representação; Erro; Nietzsche; Kant; Nature; Representation; Error; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

This text investigates three concepts vastly explored by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in his work Human, all too human (1878): nature, representation and error. The intrinsic connection between these concepts is established by the philosopher in the aphorism 19 (“nature = world as representation, that is, as error”) after a direct quotation of Immanuel Kant’s Prolegomena (1782). The allusion to the Könisberg’s philosopher determined this investigation, because the tacit and extremely complex dialogue between the authors motivated a Study of Sources to determine in which way these three concepts were not developed in MA/HH by thinking with (mit) and against (gegen) Kant. By the means of a comparative study, we verified that in Nietzche’s conception of Nature there are echoes of Kant’s conception, because nature is not equivalent to things in themselves, but it is a construct. We defend, therefore, that in MA/HH there is a representational anthropomorphism of nature, but that does not mean that Nietzsche’s position is reduced to Kant’s, as the first abandons the legitimative project of the fundamentation of knowledge. In relation to the concept of representation, we argue that Kant’s position in the PLG/KGS 4 echoes in MA/HH because this concept disarticulates any possibility of a metaphysical knowledge about the world, what is essential to MA/HH in its anti metaphysical project, as it prepares in a significative way to the notion of invention and representations’ consolidation without any pretension of absolute truth. Nonetheless, we must recognise that the epistemic foundation of representations in the self does not exists, since it finds itself in the body’s physiology and its dynamic structure centered in the sensation (dialogue with F. Lange). The representation is, therefore, a dynamic structure and, because of that, an object of history in its multiple presentations. The problem of the error determines in our argument the greatest point of tension and distance between Nietzsche’s and Kant’s philosophies, because the world as representation, nature itself, is submitted to many errors. While problematic, we argue that Nietzsche works with a correspondential conception of truth, not with the pretension of presupposing absolute truths in the interior of representation, but to show the fragility of the classical conception of truth. The non-correspondence between word/intellect and fact/thing makes, necessarily, the error, and Nietzsche in a dialogue with A. Spir (1837-1890) adopts this position parasitarily to extract conclusions contrary to the metaphysical projects, e.g., that we are immersed in non-truth. He does that to turn the tables, because from successive erroneous processes that occur in representation (e.g. simplification and inaccuracy) the philosopher can point out how truth (alleged truth or inferred essence) is depend on error and not the contrary. Therefore, the error seems to us less contingent in human interpretation of nature and more as a necessary condition of the human.