O Realismo modal de David Lewis: uma opção pragmática

• Autor(a) principal: ROCHA, Renato Mendes
• Data de Publicação: 2010
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFG
• dARK ID: ark:/38995/00130000015ht
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tde/778
• topic: Mundos Possíveis; Realismo Modal; David Lewis; Pragmatismo; 1. Realismo Modal 2. Filosofia Contemporânea 3. Mundos Possíveis; Possible Worlds; Modal Realism; David Lewis; Pragmatism; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

In this dissertation we will defend Lewis Modal Realism (LMR), i.e., the metaphysical hypothesis about the real existence of a plurality of worlds. We will try to show the pragmatic character of Lewis arguments in support of this metaphysics of possible worlds. In this sense, we approximate Lewis (1986) and Quine (1960) and we aim to show that Lewis uses criteria for taking ontological decisions similar to those defended by Quine. These criteria are: simplicity of formulation, theoretical economy and distrust in purely intuitive criteria as only guide for Philosophy. To accomplish our intention, we divided the text in three chapters. In the first we present the philosophical benefits of LMR that demonstrate the theoretical utility of possible-worlds talk. These benefits are related to important concepts in Philosophy of Language and Epistemology, such as, Modality, Counterfactuals and a uniform treatment to Properties and Propositions. The second chapter is divided into two parts. At first we present the philosophical background we believe is related to Lewis philosophy. A neo-humean scenario and the resumption of metaphysics discussion in contemporary analytic philosophy compose this background. In the second part we present three fundamental thesis formulate by Lewis the consistence of his Modal Realism: concreteness, isolation and plenitude. In the third and latter chapter we discuss two criticism of LMR: (a) David Armstrong & Peter Forrest (1984) and (b) Susan Haack (1977). Each of these papers present criticism from distinct points of view. The first aims to identify a paradox in the metaphysics of possible worlds, and the latter focuses on semantics aspects of LMR. Finally, we show Lewis reply to objection (a) and that argument (b) could be inserted as an incredulous stare on LMR, and that it consists on a petition principi.