Avaliação de desempenho e remuneração de executivos em empresas familiares brasileiras

• Autor(a) principal: Santos, Thaisa Renata dos
• Data de Publicação: 2018
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFG
• dARK ID: ark:/38995/00130000052zb
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/9734
• topic: Empresas familiares; Avaliação de desempenho; Remuneração de executivos; ADMINISTRACAO::CIENCIAS CONTABEIS

There is evidence that in family companies, performance indicators are used to a lesser extent for the evaluation of executives, and that the remuneration of these directors tends to be lower when compared to other companies characterized as non-familiar. Besides that, it is assumed that the agency relationship is distinct in family firms, where agency costs may be less prevalent, impacting performance evaluation plans and executive compensation. In this sense, this study aims to verify the influence of the family in the evaluation of performance and in the remuneration of executives in Brazilian publicly traded companies. To analyze the relationships, the survey was carried out through data collection in 110 publicly traded companies, from 2010 to 2016. The data was analyzed through statistical analysis, using the moderation technique to capture the influence of the family in the use of performance evaluation indicators of the executives. The results indicated that the family influence perceived by the family's presence in the company has a direct relation with the total remuneration and with the variable remuneration provided to the executives. However, the relationship between the use of performance evaluation indicators for executives' remuneration was only verified when the influence of the family has a moderating role in this relationship. The findings show that, when family firms use some indicator of organizational performance evaluation in the process of evaluating executives' performance, the variable remuneration conceived tends to be smaller. On the other hand, when using indicators for short and long-term performance evaluation, the provision of incentives in Brazilian family enterprises is greater. In addition, when family companies make use of some indicator, in a short- and long-terms, the greater the total remuneration of the executives of the statutory board in Brazilian family-owned companies tends to be. Therefore, the influence of the family in the company affects the relation of performance evaluation and compensation of the executives, aligning the use of performance evaluation indicators according to the interests of the family and consequently influencing the remuneration spent.