KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Kriterion (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41306 |
Resumo: | In this paper I attempt to show how an important traditional line of interpretation of Kantian philosophy went astray by the fact that Kant works in its practical philosophy with two distinct and apparently conflicting conceptions of the freedom of human will, namely, freedom as noumenal causality and freedom as the power of choice between alternative possibilities. Firstly, I argue that no conception of freedom in Kant`s philosophy can possibly conflict with that asserted in his most foundational works on practical philosophy, which defines freedom as the actual exercise of moral rationality. I next endeavor to show, by means of both textual and conceptual arguments, the inconsistency of the dominant adoption of a wrong version of the second alternative, namely that of freedom of choice as a supposed free power of choosing for or against morality. Finally, I defend that the only consistent way of conceiving of Kant`s freedom of choice in accordance with his freedom as the actual exercise of morality reveals a real conceptual difficulty in Kant`s practical philosophy, namely, the problem of the accountability of immoral decisions. The guiding-thread of this exposition is an interpretation of Karl Ameriks`s article of 2002: “Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will”. |
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KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILUREKANT, LIBERDADE E A HERMENÊUTICA DO FRACASSOLiberdadeMoralidadeEscolhaImputabilidadeFreedomMoralityChoiceImputationIn this paper I attempt to show how an important traditional line of interpretation of Kantian philosophy went astray by the fact that Kant works in its practical philosophy with two distinct and apparently conflicting conceptions of the freedom of human will, namely, freedom as noumenal causality and freedom as the power of choice between alternative possibilities. Firstly, I argue that no conception of freedom in Kant`s philosophy can possibly conflict with that asserted in his most foundational works on practical philosophy, which defines freedom as the actual exercise of moral rationality. I next endeavor to show, by means of both textual and conceptual arguments, the inconsistency of the dominant adoption of a wrong version of the second alternative, namely that of freedom of choice as a supposed free power of choosing for or against morality. Finally, I defend that the only consistent way of conceiving of Kant`s freedom of choice in accordance with his freedom as the actual exercise of morality reveals a real conceptual difficulty in Kant`s practical philosophy, namely, the problem of the accountability of immoral decisions. The guiding-thread of this exposition is an interpretation of Karl Ameriks`s article of 2002: “Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will”.Neste artigo, analiso o modo como uma importante tradição interpretativa do kantismo se deixou desencaminhar pelo fato de Kant trabalhar, em sua filosofia prática, com duas acepções distintas e aparentemente conflitantes da liberdade da vontade humana em sentido positivo: como causalidade numênica e como poder de escolha entre possibilidades alternativas. Em primeiro lugar, defendo que nenhuma acepção de liberdade na filosofia kantiana pode ser conflitante com aquela que, afirmada nas mais importantes obras fundacionais do filósofo, a define como o efetivo (e não meramente potencial) exercício da racionalidade moral. Em seguida, procuro mostrar, por argumentos tanto textuais, quanto conceituais, a impertinência da adesão predominante a uma versão equivocada da segunda delas: a liberdade de escolha como o poder de escolher a favor ou contra a moralidade. Finalmente, sustento que a única maneira consistente de se entender a liberdade de escolha em consonância com a liberdade como efetivo exercício da moralidade implica uma real dificuldade conceitual no kantismo, que é o problema da imputabilidade das decisões imorais. O fio condutor desta exposição é uma interpretação de passagens essenciais do artigo de Karl Ameriks de 2002 intitulado “Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will”.Revista KriterionRevista KriterionKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaRevista Kriterion2023-10-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41306Revista Kriterion; Vol. 64 No. 155 (2023)Revista Kriterion; Vol. 64 Núm. 155 (2023)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 64 No 155 (2023)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 64 N. 155 (2023)Revista Kriterion; v. 64 n. 155 (2023)1981-53360100-512Xreponame:Kriterion (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGporhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41306/38782Copyright (c) 2023 Revista Kriterionhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRego, Pedro2023-10-02T23:32:04Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/41306Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterionPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/oairevistakriterion@gmail.com1981-53360100-512Xopendoar:2024-01-24T12:41:31.813624Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE KANT, LIBERDADE E A HERMENÊUTICA DO FRACASSO |
title |
KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE |
spellingShingle |
KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE Rego, Pedro Liberdade Moralidade Escolha Imputabilidade Freedom Morality Choice Imputation |
title_short |
KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE |
title_full |
KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE |
title_fullStr |
KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE |
title_full_unstemmed |
KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE |
title_sort |
KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE |
author |
Rego, Pedro |
author_facet |
Rego, Pedro |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Rego, Pedro |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Liberdade Moralidade Escolha Imputabilidade Freedom Morality Choice Imputation |
topic |
Liberdade Moralidade Escolha Imputabilidade Freedom Morality Choice Imputation |
description |
In this paper I attempt to show how an important traditional line of interpretation of Kantian philosophy went astray by the fact that Kant works in its practical philosophy with two distinct and apparently conflicting conceptions of the freedom of human will, namely, freedom as noumenal causality and freedom as the power of choice between alternative possibilities. Firstly, I argue that no conception of freedom in Kant`s philosophy can possibly conflict with that asserted in his most foundational works on practical philosophy, which defines freedom as the actual exercise of moral rationality. I next endeavor to show, by means of both textual and conceptual arguments, the inconsistency of the dominant adoption of a wrong version of the second alternative, namely that of freedom of choice as a supposed free power of choosing for or against morality. Finally, I defend that the only consistent way of conceiving of Kant`s freedom of choice in accordance with his freedom as the actual exercise of morality reveals a real conceptual difficulty in Kant`s practical philosophy, namely, the problem of the accountability of immoral decisions. The guiding-thread of this exposition is an interpretation of Karl Ameriks`s article of 2002: “Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will”. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-10-02 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41306 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41306 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41306/38782 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Revista Kriterion https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Revista Kriterion https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion; Vol. 64 No. 155 (2023) Revista Kriterion; Vol. 64 Núm. 155 (2023) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 64 No 155 (2023) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 64 N. 155 (2023) Revista Kriterion; v. 64 n. 155 (2023) 1981-5336 0100-512X reponame:Kriterion (Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) instacron:UFMG |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
instacron_str |
UFMG |
institution |
UFMG |
reponame_str |
Kriterion (Online) |
collection |
Kriterion (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revistakriterion@gmail.com |
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