AGAINST THE REDUCTIONISTIC INTERPRETATION OF DAVID HUME’S EXPERIMENTAL METHOD

• Autor(a) principal: Calvente, Sofia
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: spa
• Título da fonte: Kriterion (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/27024
• topic: Experiencia; Máxima metodológica; Introspección; Simpatía; Observación; Experience; Methodological maxim; Introspection; Observation; Sympathy

A restricted interpretation of Humean methodology understands his experimentalism solely in terms of reducing epistemic statements to private sensory impressions accessible via introspection. My aim is to revise this interpretation by means of criticizing the connection it establishes between the maxim of not going beyond experience and the copy principle. I will show that this interpretation is inconsistent with the way Hume conceives the experimental method, since there is textual evidence to affirm that experience should not be understood in terms of sensory impressions only, and that the science of human nature is not restricted to the study of the mental contents only, but it is nourished in the same way by the observation of social interaction. Finally, I will argue that the method Hume proposes does not prevent intersubjective verification of the empirical evidence, since the principle of sympathy enables the communication of mental states, which makes them devoid of their private character.