JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Renato Lopes Becho
Data de Publicação: 2024
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Online)
Texto Completo: https://www.direito.ufmg.br/revista/index.php/revista/article/view/2552
Resumo: The dogmatic of the Brazilian Tax Law is structured on a solid theoretical basis, which is Kelsenian positivism. However, at present, the system does not offer legal certainty, especially if we observe administrative and judicial decisions that not strictly apply to the legislation. Faced with this reality, the objective of this article is to reanalyze the theory from the Philosophy of Science, questioning whether its scientific character is pacific. Applying the zetetic method, the investigation addresses the scientific revolution, scientific reasoning processes (deduction and induction), and the uniqueness of science; then, it presents the division between legal sociology, through the work of Eugen Ehrlich, and the dogmatic science of law; analyzes the theme in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law, including under the influence of the scientific movement of his time; the difficulties of his theory vis-à-vis the common law, where the distinction between legal sociology and legal science is meaningless; and shows reflections on Brazilian Tax Law. In conclusion, it is proposed to expand the empirical data to be used by tax experts to add to the legislated rules (should-be) also those arising from court decisions (to be). Thus, the legal science label is preserved, but not the distinction between sociology of law and legal dogmatics.
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spelling JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAWAS DECISÕES JUDICIAIS COMO UM DESAFIO CIENTÍFICO PARA O DIREITO TRIBUTÁRIO - DOI: 10.12818/P.0304-2340.2023v82p291The dogmatic of the Brazilian Tax Law is structured on a solid theoretical basis, which is Kelsenian positivism. However, at present, the system does not offer legal certainty, especially if we observe administrative and judicial decisions that not strictly apply to the legislation. Faced with this reality, the objective of this article is to reanalyze the theory from the Philosophy of Science, questioning whether its scientific character is pacific. Applying the zetetic method, the investigation addresses the scientific revolution, scientific reasoning processes (deduction and induction), and the uniqueness of science; then, it presents the division between legal sociology, through the work of Eugen Ehrlich, and the dogmatic science of law; analyzes the theme in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law, including under the influence of the scientific movement of his time; the difficulties of his theory vis-à-vis the common law, where the distinction between legal sociology and legal science is meaningless; and shows reflections on Brazilian Tax Law. In conclusion, it is proposed to expand the empirical data to be used by tax experts to add to the legislated rules (should-be) also those arising from court decisions (to be). Thus, the legal science label is preserved, but not the distinction between sociology of law and legal dogmatics.A dogmática do Direito Tributário brasileiro é estruturada sobre uma base teórica sólida, que é o positivismo kelseniano. Porém, na atualidade, o sistema não oferece segurança jurídica, notadamente se observarmos decisões administrativas e judiciais que não aplicam a legislação. Frente a essa realidade, o objetivo deste artigo é reanalisar a teoria do Direito Tributário a partir da Filosofia da Ciência, questionando se é pacífico seu caráter científico. Aplicando o método zetético, a investigação aborda a revolução científica, os processos de raciocínio científico (dedução e indução) e a unicidade das ciências; em seguida, apresenta a divisão entre sociologia jurídica, pela obra de Eugen Ehrlich, e ciência dogmática do direito; analisa o tema na teoria pura do direito de Hans Kelsen, inclusive sob influência do movimento científico de sua época; as dificuldades de sua teoria frente ao common law, onde a distinção entre sociologia jurídica e ciência do direito não tem sentido; e mostra reflexos no Direito Tributário brasileiro. Como conclusão, é proposta a ampliação dos dados empíricos a serem utilizados pelos tributaristas, para acrescentarem às regras legisladas (dever-ser) também as decorrentes de decisões judiciais (ser). Assim, preserva-se o rótulo ciência jurídica, mas não a distinção entre a sociologia do direito e dogmática jurídica.UFMG2024-01-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.direito.ufmg.br/revista/index.php/revista/article/view/255210.12818/P.0304-2340.2023v82p291REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UFMG; n. 82 (2023); 291-3201984-18410304-234010.12818/P.0304-2340.2023v82reponame:Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGporhttps://www.direito.ufmg.br/revista/index.php/revista/article/view/2552/2072Copyright (c) 2024 REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UFMGinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRenato Lopes Becho2024-02-01T13:31:51Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/2552Revistahttps://www.direito.ufmg.br/revista/index.php/revistaPUBhttps://www.direito.ufmg.br/revista/index.php/revista/oairevista@direito.ufmg.br1984-18410304-2340opendoar:2024-02-01T13:31:51Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW
AS DECISÕES JUDICIAIS COMO UM DESAFIO CIENTÍFICO PARA O DIREITO TRIBUTÁRIO - DOI: 10.12818/P.0304-2340.2023v82p291
title JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW
spellingShingle JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW
Renato Lopes Becho
title_short JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW
title_full JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW
title_fullStr JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW
title_full_unstemmed JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW
title_sort JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO TAX LAW
author Renato Lopes Becho
author_facet Renato Lopes Becho
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Renato Lopes Becho
description The dogmatic of the Brazilian Tax Law is structured on a solid theoretical basis, which is Kelsenian positivism. However, at present, the system does not offer legal certainty, especially if we observe administrative and judicial decisions that not strictly apply to the legislation. Faced with this reality, the objective of this article is to reanalyze the theory from the Philosophy of Science, questioning whether its scientific character is pacific. Applying the zetetic method, the investigation addresses the scientific revolution, scientific reasoning processes (deduction and induction), and the uniqueness of science; then, it presents the division between legal sociology, through the work of Eugen Ehrlich, and the dogmatic science of law; analyzes the theme in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law, including under the influence of the scientific movement of his time; the difficulties of his theory vis-à-vis the common law, where the distinction between legal sociology and legal science is meaningless; and shows reflections on Brazilian Tax Law. In conclusion, it is proposed to expand the empirical data to be used by tax experts to add to the legislated rules (should-be) also those arising from court decisions (to be). Thus, the legal science label is preserved, but not the distinction between sociology of law and legal dogmatics.
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dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01-18
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.direito.ufmg.br/revista/index.php/revista/article/view/2552/2072
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dc.source.none.fl_str_mv REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UFMG; n. 82 (2023); 291-320
1984-1841
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10.12818/P.0304-2340.2023v82
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