The plurality of object versus pluralism of conceptions on psychological theories

• Autor(a) principal: Gomes, William Barbosa
• Data de Publicação: 2021
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Memorandum (Belo Horizonte)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/memorandum/article/view/25462
• topic: unidade teórica; integração teórica; diversidade teórica; theoretical unity; theoretical integration; theoretical diversity

Unity (plurality) versus disunity (pluralism) has been a frequent conceptual debate about the existence of one or more psychologies. In literature, the debates have intensified with the series Psychology: A Study of a Science, edited by Sigmund Koch, between 1959 and 1963. At the end of the six published volumes, Koch concluded that psychology is not a coherent science but a collection of studies, ranging from greater or lesser scientific rigor. Since then, the theme has been frequent in the few journals open to theoretical psychology, bringing propositions of unifying theories, defense of unification by areas, or claims that the greatness of the discipline lies in diversity. This article argues that the pressing need is not for theories that suggest modes of unity, but for criteria that point to possibilities of moving successfully between theories, taking into account the surprising implicit relationships among them.