Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Oliveira, Wagner
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Transversal (Belo Horizonte)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35133
Resumo: For dropping the incommensurability idea elaborated at the time of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn dismisses the concept of “revolution”. The incommensurability involved the incomparability of theories. In this new environment, the revolution is replaced by conceptual reformulation and the incommensurability becomes occasional. The linguistic turn in Kuhn’s thought involves conceptual changes whose aim is to get around the accusation of relativism that the former notion of incommensurability arouses. The most fundamental effect of these conceptual reformulations is the commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. It changes the comprehension of the historical and social nature of the foundations of the changes that scientific knowledge goes through. The comparison between the answer to the problem of paradigm priority attributed by Kuhn to Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein by himself shows that the basis of the normative nature of paradigm commitment is an essentialist concern. In the second half of this paper, I will evaluate Kuhn’s manner of getting around the problems of incommensurability in contrast to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy dealing with similar issues in On Certainty. This enables one to essay answers to the problems of incommensurability without relativism or any commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. These contrasts show how far Kuhn’s new theory of science departs from the Wittgensteinian inspiration and abandons the point of view of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The development of these two halves makes it possible to indicate reasons to believe that questions concerning the theory and history of science can benefit largely from a grammatical exploration, which gives rise to a theory of science inspired by Wittgenstein’s thought, as Mauro Condé suggests.
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spelling Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and IncommensurabilityKuhnWittgensteinIncommensurabilityParadigmGrammarCertaintyFor dropping the incommensurability idea elaborated at the time of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn dismisses the concept of “revolution”. The incommensurability involved the incomparability of theories. In this new environment, the revolution is replaced by conceptual reformulation and the incommensurability becomes occasional. The linguistic turn in Kuhn’s thought involves conceptual changes whose aim is to get around the accusation of relativism that the former notion of incommensurability arouses. The most fundamental effect of these conceptual reformulations is the commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. It changes the comprehension of the historical and social nature of the foundations of the changes that scientific knowledge goes through. The comparison between the answer to the problem of paradigm priority attributed by Kuhn to Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein by himself shows that the basis of the normative nature of paradigm commitment is an essentialist concern. In the second half of this paper, I will evaluate Kuhn’s manner of getting around the problems of incommensurability in contrast to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy dealing with similar issues in On Certainty. This enables one to essay answers to the problems of incommensurability without relativism or any commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. These contrasts show how far Kuhn’s new theory of science departs from the Wittgensteinian inspiration and abandons the point of view of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The development of these two halves makes it possible to indicate reasons to believe that questions concerning the theory and history of science can benefit largely from a grammatical exploration, which gives rise to a theory of science inspired by Wittgenstein’s thought, as Mauro Condé suggests.Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais2021-06-17info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/3513310.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.05Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science EducationTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; Núm. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science EducationTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science EducationTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; n. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education2526-2270reponame:Transversal (Belo Horizonte)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGenghttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35133/27728Copyright (c) 2021 Wagner Oliveirahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessOliveira, Wagner2021-07-26T19:46:24Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/35133Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/indexPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/oaimauroconde@ufmg.br2526-22702526-2270opendoar:2021-07-26T19:46:24Transversal (Belo Horizonte) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability
title Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability
spellingShingle Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability
Oliveira, Wagner
Kuhn
Wittgenstein
Incommensurability
Paradigm
Grammar
Certainty
title_short Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability
title_full Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability
title_fullStr Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability
title_full_unstemmed Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability
title_sort Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability
author Oliveira, Wagner
author_facet Oliveira, Wagner
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Oliveira, Wagner
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Kuhn
Wittgenstein
Incommensurability
Paradigm
Grammar
Certainty
topic Kuhn
Wittgenstein
Incommensurability
Paradigm
Grammar
Certainty
description For dropping the incommensurability idea elaborated at the time of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn dismisses the concept of “revolution”. The incommensurability involved the incomparability of theories. In this new environment, the revolution is replaced by conceptual reformulation and the incommensurability becomes occasional. The linguistic turn in Kuhn’s thought involves conceptual changes whose aim is to get around the accusation of relativism that the former notion of incommensurability arouses. The most fundamental effect of these conceptual reformulations is the commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. It changes the comprehension of the historical and social nature of the foundations of the changes that scientific knowledge goes through. The comparison between the answer to the problem of paradigm priority attributed by Kuhn to Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein by himself shows that the basis of the normative nature of paradigm commitment is an essentialist concern. In the second half of this paper, I will evaluate Kuhn’s manner of getting around the problems of incommensurability in contrast to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy dealing with similar issues in On Certainty. This enables one to essay answers to the problems of incommensurability without relativism or any commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. These contrasts show how far Kuhn’s new theory of science departs from the Wittgensteinian inspiration and abandons the point of view of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The development of these two halves makes it possible to indicate reasons to believe that questions concerning the theory and history of science can benefit largely from a grammatical exploration, which gives rise to a theory of science inspired by Wittgenstein’s thought, as Mauro Condé suggests.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-06-17
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35133
10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.05
url https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35133
identifier_str_mv 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.05
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35133/27728
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Wagner Oliveira
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Wagner Oliveira
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; Núm. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; n. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education
2526-2270
reponame:Transversal (Belo Horizonte)
instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron:UFMG
instname_str Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron_str UFMG
institution UFMG
reponame_str Transversal (Belo Horizonte)
collection Transversal (Belo Horizonte)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Transversal (Belo Horizonte) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mauroconde@ufmg.br
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