O significado prático de termos modais na filosofia moral kantiana

• Autor(a) principal: Joãosinho Beckenkamp
• Data de Publicação: 2018
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFMG
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/41883
• topic: Direito; Kant; Semântica; Direito; Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804; Semântica (Filosofia); Significação (Filosofia)

Following Leibniz and the Wolffian School, Kant frequently makes use of modal terms like “possible” and “possibility” in a practical or moral sense (meaning “licit” or “permissible”). As this practical meaning of the terms is highly operative in Kant’s arguments in his Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Right, it should be clarified before undertaking any interpretation of this doctrine. In order to show that a practical semantics of modal terms is usual at least since Leibniz, I will beginn with the formalization of this semantics in contemporary deontic logic and then proceed to the leibnizian beginnings of the procedure. Main issue of this article is however to make such an important topic ready to be used in the analysis of Kant’s arguments in his doctrine of right, especially his deduction of a right to property.