Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Philipe de Freitas Melo
Publication Date: 2022
Format: Doctoral thesis
Language: eng
Source: Repositório Institucional da UFMG
Download full: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/49506
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9830-1896
Summary: The Internet has gained an increasing space in our lives. Social media, especially the Instant Messaging Platforms (IMPs), permeate our relationships and the way we communicate. These platforms allow users to communicate both in a more private and personal conversation, as well as engaging in large public chat groups, in which multiple users interact with each other and share interests. Due to their great success and popularity, these platforms have unfortunately also become a fertile environment for misinformation campaigns that spread rumors, false news, hate speech, and online lynching. However, the closed operating structure of messaging services, such as WhatsApp and Telegram, makes it difficult to investigate the content that circulates within these platforms. In this thesis, we investigate the WhatsApp ecosystem and the (mis)information that spreads on the platform. This task presents a unique challenge, as the content circulating on the WhatsApp network is protected by an end-to-end encryption layer and takes place in private or hard-to-access channels, while, at the same time, this generally anonymous content still manages to spread virally over the network to thousands of users. We focus on this public side of WhatsApp, providing an in-depth understanding of the instant messaging ecosystem, revealing how misinformation campaigns abuse this cyberspace, and also proposing countermeasures to address this issue. First, we developed a new WhatsApp data collection methodology capable of gathering large-scale and long-term data from public groups, in which we collect more than 10 million messages from political groups on WhatsApp in Brazil for more than 3 years. This methodology opens up a new path for studies investigating the WhatsApp platform, revealing trends and the most popular content posted on it. Then, we performed a comparative analysis of IMPs, providing a better understanding of this universe of public groups shared on social networks. We show that there is a substantial amount of public WhatsApp groups and shed light on the main characteristics of the most used instant messaging services. We also explore the behavior of WhatsApp's public political groups, investigating their published messages and some events captured by our dataset, including the misinformation shared during these periods. In relation to these groups, we also explore how misinformation spreads through the WhatsApp network, evaluating how some features of the system impact the flow of information dissemination. Our results reveal that these features help to slow down the spread of content, but do not prevent it from going viral. Finally, we present two practical and viable measures to combat misinformation on WhatsApp. We propose an architecture compatible with WhatsApp E2E encryption and that does not violate any users' privacy. This approach relies on using content that has been previously checked out by specialized agencies and could be easily deployed into the WhatsApp app to help users identify misinformation in the chat. Second, we developed and launched a real system - WhatsApp Monitor - that processes the most popular content shared every day in WhatsApp public groups, ranking and displaying the most uploaded images, videos, audios and images in a web interface that it is already used by many journalists and researchers to fight misinformation.
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spelling Fabrício Benevenuto de Souzahttp://lattes.cnpq.br/7014991384513854Pedro Olmo Stancioli Vaz de MeloHeitor Soares Ramos FilhoAltigran Soares da SilvaRaquel da Cunha Recuerohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/7816284556585026Philipe de Freitas Melo2023-02-03T13:28:28Z2023-02-03T13:28:28Z2022-12-16http://hdl.handle.net/1843/49506https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9830-1896The Internet has gained an increasing space in our lives. Social media, especially the Instant Messaging Platforms (IMPs), permeate our relationships and the way we communicate. These platforms allow users to communicate both in a more private and personal conversation, as well as engaging in large public chat groups, in which multiple users interact with each other and share interests. Due to their great success and popularity, these platforms have unfortunately also become a fertile environment for misinformation campaigns that spread rumors, false news, hate speech, and online lynching. However, the closed operating structure of messaging services, such as WhatsApp and Telegram, makes it difficult to investigate the content that circulates within these platforms. In this thesis, we investigate the WhatsApp ecosystem and the (mis)information that spreads on the platform. This task presents a unique challenge, as the content circulating on the WhatsApp network is protected by an end-to-end encryption layer and takes place in private or hard-to-access channels, while, at the same time, this generally anonymous content still manages to spread virally over the network to thousands of users. We focus on this public side of WhatsApp, providing an in-depth understanding of the instant messaging ecosystem, revealing how misinformation campaigns abuse this cyberspace, and also proposing countermeasures to address this issue. First, we developed a new WhatsApp data collection methodology capable of gathering large-scale and long-term data from public groups, in which we collect more than 10 million messages from political groups on WhatsApp in Brazil for more than 3 years. This methodology opens up a new path for studies investigating the WhatsApp platform, revealing trends and the most popular content posted on it. Then, we performed a comparative analysis of IMPs, providing a better understanding of this universe of public groups shared on social networks. We show that there is a substantial amount of public WhatsApp groups and shed light on the main characteristics of the most used instant messaging services. We also explore the behavior of WhatsApp's public political groups, investigating their published messages and some events captured by our dataset, including the misinformation shared during these periods. In relation to these groups, we also explore how misinformation spreads through the WhatsApp network, evaluating how some features of the system impact the flow of information dissemination. Our results reveal that these features help to slow down the spread of content, but do not prevent it from going viral. Finally, we present two practical and viable measures to combat misinformation on WhatsApp. We propose an architecture compatible with WhatsApp E2E encryption and that does not violate any users' privacy. This approach relies on using content that has been previously checked out by specialized agencies and could be easily deployed into the WhatsApp app to help users identify misinformation in the chat. Second, we developed and launched a real system - WhatsApp Monitor - that processes the most popular content shared every day in WhatsApp public groups, ranking and displaying the most uploaded images, videos, audios and images in a web interface that it is already used by many journalists and researchers to fight misinformation.A Internet tem conquistado um espaço cada vez maior em nossa vida. As mídias sociais, em especial as plataformas de mensagens instantâneas (PMIs) permeiam nossas relações e a forma com que nos comunicamos. Essas plataformas permitem usuários se comunicarem tanto de forma mais privada e pessoal, como também possuem grandes grupos de conversa público, no qual múltiplos usuários interagem entre si e compartilham interesses. Devido seu grande sucesso e popularidade, essas plataformas, infelizmente, também se tornaram um local fértil para campanhas de desinformação que espalham boatos, notícias falsas, discurso de ódio e linchamento online. Entretanto, a estrutura fechada de funcionamento dos serviços de mensagens, tais como WhatsApp e Telegram, dificultam a investigação do conteúdo que circula dentro destas plataformas. Nesta tese, investigamos o ambiente do WhatsApp e a (des)informação que se espalha na plataforma. Essa tarefa apresenta um desafio único, pois o conteúdo que circula na rede do WhatsApp é protegido por uma camada de criptografia ponta a ponta e acontecem em canais privados ou de difícil acesso, enquanto esse conteúdo, geralmente anônimo, ainda consegue se espalhar de forma viral pela rede para milhares de usuários. Exploramos esse lado público do WhatsApp, fornecendo um conhecimento aprofundado sobre o ecossistema de mensagens instantâneas, revelando como as campanhas de desinformação abusam desse ciberespaço e também propondo contramedidas para enfrentar esse problema. Primeiramente, desenvolvemos uma nova metodologia de coleta de dados no WhatsApp capaz de reunir dados em larga escala e de longo prazo de grupos públicos, na qual coletamos mais de 10 milhões de mensagens de grupos políticos no WhatsApp no Brasil. Esta metodologia abre um novo rumo nos estudos que investigam da plataforma do WhatsApp, revelando tendências e os conteúdos mais populares que são postados nele Em seguida, realizamos uma análise comparativa dos PMIs, proporcionando uma melhor compreensão desse universo de grupos públicos compartilhados nas redes sociais. Mostramos que existe uma enorme quantidade de grupos públicos do WhatsApp, destacando as principais características dos principais serviços de mensagens instantâneas. Também exploramos o comportamento dos grupos políticos públicos do WhatsApp, investigando as mensagens publicadas e alguns eventos capturados por nosso conjunto de dados, incluindo a desinformação compartilhada nesses períodos. Em relação a esses grupos, exploramos ainda como a desinformação se espalha por meio da rede WhatsApp, avaliando como algumas funcionalidades do sistema impactam no fluxo de disseminação da informação. Nossos resultados revelam que esses recursos ajudam a desacelerar a disseminação do conteúdo, entretanto não evitam que ele se torne viral. Por fim, apresentamos duas medidas práticas e viáveis para se combater desinformação no WhatsApp. Propomos uma arquitetura compatível com a criptografia do WhatsApp e que não viole a privacidade dos usuários. Essa abordagem depende do uso de conteúdo que foi previamente checado por agencias especializadas e poderia ser facilmente implementado no aplicativo do WhatsApp para ajudar os usuários a identificar desinformação no aplicativo. Em segundo lugar, desenvolvemos e colocamos no ar um sistema real - WhatsApp Monitor - que processa os conteúdos mais populares compartilhados todos os dias nos grupos públicos do WhatsApp, ranqueando e exibindo as imagens, vídeos, áudios e imagens mais enviadas em uma interface web que já é utilizada por muitos jornalistas e pesquisadores no combate a desinformação.CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorFAPESP - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São PauloengUniversidade Federal de Minas GeraisPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Ciência da ComputaçãoUFMGBrasilICX - DEPARTAMENTO DE CIÊNCIA DA COMPUTAÇÃOhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pt/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessComputação – TesesWhatsApp (Aplicativo de mensagens) – TesesDesinformação TesesRedes sociais – TesesDisseminação de informação – TesesFake News – TesesWhatsAppMisinformationSocial networksInformation disseminationFake NewsPoliticsActivism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasuresAtivismo e desinformação no WhatsApp: medidas, análises, e contramedidasinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFMGinstname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGCC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8811https://repositorio.ufmg.br/bitstream/1843/49506/2/license_rdfcfd6801dba008cb6adbd9838b81582abMD52ORIGINALTese_PhilipeMelo_ActicismAndMisinformationOnWhatsApp.pdfTese_PhilipeMelo_ActicismAndMisinformationOnWhatsApp.pdfapplication/pdf4067118https://repositorio.ufmg.br/bitstream/1843/49506/4/Tese_PhilipeMelo_ActicismAndMisinformationOnWhatsApp.pdfa90544a81c94d87962072e8b01babfcfMD54LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82118https://repositorio.ufmg.br/bitstream/1843/49506/5/license.txtcda590c95a0b51b4d15f60c9642ca272MD551843/495062023-02-03 10:28:28.599oai:repositorio.ufmg.br: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ório de PublicaçõesPUBhttps://repositorio.ufmg.br/oaiopendoar:2023-02-03T13:28:28Repositório Institucional da UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures
dc.title.alternative.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Ativismo e desinformação no WhatsApp: medidas, análises, e contramedidas
title Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures
spellingShingle Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures
Philipe de Freitas Melo
WhatsApp
Misinformation
Social networks
Information dissemination
Fake News
Politics
Computação – Teses
WhatsApp (Aplicativo de mensagens) – Teses
Desinformação Teses
Redes sociais – Teses
Disseminação de informação – Teses
Fake News – Teses
title_short Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures
title_full Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures
title_fullStr Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures
title_full_unstemmed Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures
title_sort Activism and misinformation on WhatsApp: measurement, analysis, and countermeasures
author Philipe de Freitas Melo
author_facet Philipe de Freitas Melo
author_role author
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Fabrício Benevenuto de Souza
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/7014991384513854
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv Pedro Olmo Stancioli Vaz de Melo
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv Heitor Soares Ramos Filho
dc.contributor.referee3.fl_str_mv Altigran Soares da Silva
dc.contributor.referee4.fl_str_mv Raquel da Cunha Recuero
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/7816284556585026
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Philipe de Freitas Melo
contributor_str_mv Fabrício Benevenuto de Souza
Pedro Olmo Stancioli Vaz de Melo
Heitor Soares Ramos Filho
Altigran Soares da Silva
Raquel da Cunha Recuero
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv WhatsApp
Misinformation
Social networks
Information dissemination
Fake News
Politics
topic WhatsApp
Misinformation
Social networks
Information dissemination
Fake News
Politics
Computação – Teses
WhatsApp (Aplicativo de mensagens) – Teses
Desinformação Teses
Redes sociais – Teses
Disseminação de informação – Teses
Fake News – Teses
dc.subject.other.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Computação – Teses
WhatsApp (Aplicativo de mensagens) – Teses
Desinformação Teses
Redes sociais – Teses
Disseminação de informação – Teses
Fake News – Teses
description The Internet has gained an increasing space in our lives. Social media, especially the Instant Messaging Platforms (IMPs), permeate our relationships and the way we communicate. These platforms allow users to communicate both in a more private and personal conversation, as well as engaging in large public chat groups, in which multiple users interact with each other and share interests. Due to their great success and popularity, these platforms have unfortunately also become a fertile environment for misinformation campaigns that spread rumors, false news, hate speech, and online lynching. However, the closed operating structure of messaging services, such as WhatsApp and Telegram, makes it difficult to investigate the content that circulates within these platforms. In this thesis, we investigate the WhatsApp ecosystem and the (mis)information that spreads on the platform. This task presents a unique challenge, as the content circulating on the WhatsApp network is protected by an end-to-end encryption layer and takes place in private or hard-to-access channels, while, at the same time, this generally anonymous content still manages to spread virally over the network to thousands of users. We focus on this public side of WhatsApp, providing an in-depth understanding of the instant messaging ecosystem, revealing how misinformation campaigns abuse this cyberspace, and also proposing countermeasures to address this issue. First, we developed a new WhatsApp data collection methodology capable of gathering large-scale and long-term data from public groups, in which we collect more than 10 million messages from political groups on WhatsApp in Brazil for more than 3 years. This methodology opens up a new path for studies investigating the WhatsApp platform, revealing trends and the most popular content posted on it. Then, we performed a comparative analysis of IMPs, providing a better understanding of this universe of public groups shared on social networks. We show that there is a substantial amount of public WhatsApp groups and shed light on the main characteristics of the most used instant messaging services. We also explore the behavior of WhatsApp's public political groups, investigating their published messages and some events captured by our dataset, including the misinformation shared during these periods. In relation to these groups, we also explore how misinformation spreads through the WhatsApp network, evaluating how some features of the system impact the flow of information dissemination. Our results reveal that these features help to slow down the spread of content, but do not prevent it from going viral. Finally, we present two practical and viable measures to combat misinformation on WhatsApp. We propose an architecture compatible with WhatsApp E2E encryption and that does not violate any users' privacy. This approach relies on using content that has been previously checked out by specialized agencies and could be easily deployed into the WhatsApp app to help users identify misinformation in the chat. Second, we developed and launched a real system - WhatsApp Monitor - that processes the most popular content shared every day in WhatsApp public groups, ranking and displaying the most uploaded images, videos, audios and images in a web interface that it is already used by many journalists and researchers to fight misinformation.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2022-12-16
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2023-02-03T13:28:28Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2023-02-03T13:28:28Z
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dc.publisher.program.fl_str_mv Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência da Computação
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dc.publisher.country.fl_str_mv Brasil
dc.publisher.department.fl_str_mv ICX - DEPARTAMENTO DE CIÊNCIA DA COMPUTAÇÃO
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