Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2005 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UFMG |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-9PFKTJ |
Resumo: | The main subject of this dissertation is the conception of truth in theneopragmatism of Richard Rorty. It investigates all the course of the development of this conception, since the initial appropriations of the truth conceptions of James and Dewey until the last developments of his long debate with Donald Davidson. This writer, being his most constant and important interlocutor in regard to the subject and having furnishedmost of the elements that informs Rorty's present conception of truth, has an especial part in this dissertation. The leading element on the reconstruction of this course was the question if Rorty manages to avoid what he himself calls "platonism" on philosophy and still develop a consistent conception of truth that justifies his belonging to the pragmatist tradition. With this aim, we approached in the first chapter the thought of James and Dewey in regard to truth and the critics and appropriations of both these conceptions made by Rorty. In the second chapter, we approached the conception of knowledge and truthexposed by Rorty in his most important work intending to stress not only the main points of what is needed for a secularized conception of inquiry, but also to point out the conception of truth internal to it. In the third chapter we approached his discussion with Davidson in regard to truth in order to clear the main points of Rorty's conception of truth and todemonstrate that, without the support given by some Davidsonian theses, Rorty's conception of truth wouldn't stand up. Finally, we believe we demonstrated that Rorty is able to provide a consistent conception of truth that is free of platonist suppositions and can still be considered as a pragmatist perspective. |
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Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard RortyFilosofiaRorty, Richard, 1931-FilosofiaThe main subject of this dissertation is the conception of truth in theneopragmatism of Richard Rorty. It investigates all the course of the development of this conception, since the initial appropriations of the truth conceptions of James and Dewey until the last developments of his long debate with Donald Davidson. This writer, being his most constant and important interlocutor in regard to the subject and having furnishedmost of the elements that informs Rorty's present conception of truth, has an especial part in this dissertation. The leading element on the reconstruction of this course was the question if Rorty manages to avoid what he himself calls "platonism" on philosophy and still develop a consistent conception of truth that justifies his belonging to the pragmatist tradition. With this aim, we approached in the first chapter the thought of James and Dewey in regard to truth and the critics and appropriations of both these conceptions made by Rorty. In the second chapter, we approached the conception of knowledge and truthexposed by Rorty in his most important work intending to stress not only the main points of what is needed for a secularized conception of inquiry, but also to point out the conception of truth internal to it. In the third chapter we approached his discussion with Davidson in regard to truth in order to clear the main points of Rorty's conception of truth and todemonstrate that, without the support given by some Davidsonian theses, Rorty's conception of truth wouldn't stand up. Finally, we believe we demonstrated that Rorty is able to provide a consistent conception of truth that is free of platonist suppositions and can still be considered as a pragmatist perspective.Esta dissertação tem como tema principal a concepção da verdade noneopragmatismo de Richard Rorty. Ela investiga todo o percurso do desenvolvimento desta concepção, desde as apropriações iniciais das concepções da verdade de James e Dewey até os últimos desdobramentos de sua longa discussão com Donald Davidson.Este autor, por ser seu mais constante e importante interlocutor no que diz respeito ao tema e por ter fornecido a maioria dos elementos que informam a concepção atual da verdade de Rorty, tem um papel de destaque nesta dissertação. O fio condutor da reconstrução deste percurso foi a pergunta sobre se Rorty consegue rechaçar o que elemesmo chama de "platonismo" na filosofia e ainda assim desenvolver uma concepção da verdade consistente e que possibilite justificar sua pertença à tradição pragmatista. Neste escopo, tratamos no primeiro capítulo do pensamento de James e de Dewey a respeito daverdade e das críticas e apropriações de ambas estas concepções feitas por Rorty. No segundo capítulo, tratamos da concepção do conhecimento e da verdade exposta por Rorty em sua mais importante obra visando marcar não apenas os pontos principais do que seria necessário para uma concepção secularizada da investigação, mas também assinalar a concepção da verdade nela presente. No terceiro capítulo, tratamos de sua discussão a respeito da verdade com Davidson de modo a esclarecer os pontos principais da concepção da verdade de Rorty e demonstrar que, sem o suporte dado por algumasteses davidsonianas, a concepção da verdade de Rorty não se sustentaria. Por fim, acreditamos ter demonstrado que Rorty é capaz de fornecer uma concepção consistente da verdade que se liberta de suposições platonistas e pode ainda ser considerada como uma perspectiva pragmatista.Universidade Federal de Minas GeraisUFMGMaria Theresa Vaz Calvet de MagalhãesErnesto Perini Frizzera da Mota SantosEdgar da Rocha MarquesThiago Lopes Decat2019-08-14T10:58:36Z2019-08-14T10:58:36Z2005-09-09info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-9PFKTJinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessporreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFMGinstname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMG2019-11-14T15:15:46Zoai:repositorio.ufmg.br:1843/BUOS-9PFKTJRepositório InstitucionalPUBhttps://repositorio.ufmg.br/oairepositorio@ufmg.bropendoar:2019-11-14T15:15:46Repositório Institucional da UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty |
title |
Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty |
spellingShingle |
Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty Thiago Lopes Decat Filosofia Rorty, Richard, 1931- Filosofia |
title_short |
Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty |
title_full |
Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty |
title_fullStr |
Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty |
title_full_unstemmed |
Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty |
title_sort |
Representação, verdade e justificação no neopragmatismo de Richard Rorty |
author |
Thiago Lopes Decat |
author_facet |
Thiago Lopes Decat |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Maria Theresa Vaz Calvet de Magalhães Ernesto Perini Frizzera da Mota Santos Edgar da Rocha Marques |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Thiago Lopes Decat |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Filosofia Rorty, Richard, 1931- Filosofia |
topic |
Filosofia Rorty, Richard, 1931- Filosofia |
description |
The main subject of this dissertation is the conception of truth in theneopragmatism of Richard Rorty. It investigates all the course of the development of this conception, since the initial appropriations of the truth conceptions of James and Dewey until the last developments of his long debate with Donald Davidson. This writer, being his most constant and important interlocutor in regard to the subject and having furnishedmost of the elements that informs Rorty's present conception of truth, has an especial part in this dissertation. The leading element on the reconstruction of this course was the question if Rorty manages to avoid what he himself calls "platonism" on philosophy and still develop a consistent conception of truth that justifies his belonging to the pragmatist tradition. With this aim, we approached in the first chapter the thought of James and Dewey in regard to truth and the critics and appropriations of both these conceptions made by Rorty. In the second chapter, we approached the conception of knowledge and truthexposed by Rorty in his most important work intending to stress not only the main points of what is needed for a secularized conception of inquiry, but also to point out the conception of truth internal to it. In the third chapter we approached his discussion with Davidson in regard to truth in order to clear the main points of Rorty's conception of truth and todemonstrate that, without the support given by some Davidsonian theses, Rorty's conception of truth wouldn't stand up. Finally, we believe we demonstrated that Rorty is able to provide a consistent conception of truth that is free of platonist suppositions and can still be considered as a pragmatist perspective. |
publishDate |
2005 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2005-09-09 2019-08-14T10:58:36Z 2019-08-14T10:58:36Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
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masterThesis |
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publishedVersion |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-9PFKTJ |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-9PFKTJ |
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por |
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por |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais UFMG |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais UFMG |
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reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFMG instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) instacron:UFMG |
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Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
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UFMG |
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UFMG |
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Repositório Institucional da UFMG |
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Repositório Institucional da UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
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