A teoria da representação de Arthur Schopenhauer: Estética e fisiologia como duas formas contrapostas de conhecimento

• Autor(a) principal: Costa, Matheus Arthur Gadêlha
• Data de Publicação: 2014
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB
• Texto Completo: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5653
• topic: Representação; Vontade; Conhecimento; Estética; Representation; Knowledge; Will; Aesthetics; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

In his major work, The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer elaborates his Representation Theory subdivided into two counterposed considerations: the representation that follows the guide line of the principle of sufficient reason, and that which independs of this principle. In the perspective of this division, the philosopher presents his concept of knowledge, that in the same manner will be subdivided into two completely different experiences. It is in the explanation of the constitutive elements of these two counterposed conceptions of knowledge that Schopenhauer proposed himself to present significance of the World as Representation. In this manner, our work has as its main objective to show the inheret tension present between these two conceptions of knowledge, and in this way explore the limits of knowledge in general. As a methodological intention, we choose to divide the present dissertation in three parts. The first correspond to the fundamentation moment of the representation concept in an epistemological perspective, where we had the objective of show the extensive conceptual structure of Schopenhauer s theory of representation. In the second part we entered in the philosopher s first conception of knowledge, where we explored this conception s characteristic atributes and limits. In the third part we concentrated ourselves in the second knowlegde conception, where Schopenhauer has as objetive surpass the boundaries of the first and presente an entirely intuitive form of knowledge, free from the ties of a merely instrumental racionality.