Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences |
Texto Completo: | https://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/78 |
Resumo: | According to Schmid (2018) Martin Heidegger’s existential phenomenology pro-vides an accurate way to describe mental illness from an experiential point of view. Mental illness is addressed as a series of disruptions in the practical and social structures of existen-ce, by analogy with the broken tool analysis as presented in Being and Time. In this paper, I propose an analysis of Schmid’s reading in three steps: 1. I maintain that her reading implies both a categorial transgression and a functionalist perspective, both of which derive from the mistaken use of the broken tool analogy; 2. Disruptions in the practical and social structures of existence do not seem sufficient for the manifestation of mental illness; and 3. I maintain that rule-following disturbances are closely linked to the experience of illness, but just as a conse-quence of that experience. Next, I introduce an approach to the mentally ill self-understanding prior to the thematization of rule-following disturbances. I conclude by suggesting that a dis-ruption in the modal space of experience linked to affective changes plays an important role in understanding mental illness from an existential-phenomenological perspective. |
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Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology¿Herramienta rota o existencia desordenada? El problema de la enfermedad mental en la fenomenología existencialFerramenta Quebrada ou Existência Desordenada? O Problema da Enfermidade Mental na Fenomenologia ExistencialPsiquiatriaHeideggerSentimentos ExistenciaisNormatividadePsychiatryHeideggerExistential feelingsNormativityPsiquiatríaHeideggerSentimientos existencialesNormatividadAccording to Schmid (2018) Martin Heidegger’s existential phenomenology pro-vides an accurate way to describe mental illness from an experiential point of view. Mental illness is addressed as a series of disruptions in the practical and social structures of existen-ce, by analogy with the broken tool analysis as presented in Being and Time. In this paper, I propose an analysis of Schmid’s reading in three steps: 1. I maintain that her reading implies both a categorial transgression and a functionalist perspective, both of which derive from the mistaken use of the broken tool analogy; 2. Disruptions in the practical and social structures of existence do not seem sufficient for the manifestation of mental illness; and 3. I maintain that rule-following disturbances are closely linked to the experience of illness, but just as a conse-quence of that experience. Next, I introduce an approach to the mentally ill self-understanding prior to the thematization of rule-following disturbances. I conclude by suggesting that a dis-ruption in the modal space of experience linked to affective changes plays an important role in understanding mental illness from an existential-phenomenological perspective.En un trabajo reciente, Schmid (2018) presenta lo que considera la manera apropia-da de entender la enfermedad mental desde el punto de vista de la fenomenología existencial de Martin Heidegger. La enfermedad mental se presenta como una serie de rupturas en las estructuras prácticas y sociales de la existencia, por analogía con el análisis dela herramientarota presente en Ser y Tiempo. En este trabajo, propongo un análisis de la lectura de Schmid en tres etapas: 1. Sostengo que esta lectura implica tanto una transgresión categórica como una perspectiva funcionalista, ambas derivadas de la analogía equivocada con el modo de ser de los utensilios; 2. Las rupturas en las estructuras prácticas y sociales de la existencia no parecen ser suficientes para la manifestación de la enfermedad mental; y 3. Sostengo que las perturba-ciones en la observancia de las normas están estrechamente vinculadas a la experiencia de la enfermedad, pero sólo como consecuencia de ella. A continuación, introduzco un enfoque de la autocomprensión de los enfermos mentales previo a la cuestión de los trastornos de con-formidad a las normas. Concluyo que una perturbación en el espacio modal de la experiencia causada por cambios afectivos desempeña un papel importante en la comprensión de la enfer-medad mental desde la perspectiva fenomenológico-existencial.Em um trabalho recente, Schmid (2018) apresenta o que considera a forma adequa-da de compreensão da enfermidade mental do ponto de vista da fenomenologia existencial de Martin Heidegger. A enfermidade mental é apresentada como uma série de rupturas nas estruturas práticas e sociais da existência, através da analogia com a análise do utensílio que-brado presente em Ser e Tempo. Neste trabalho, proponho uma análise da leitura de Schmid em três etapas: 1. Sustento que esta leitura implica tanto uma transgressão categorial quanto uma perspectiva funcionalista, ambas derivadas da analogia equivocada com o modo de ser dos utensílios; 2. As rupturas nas estruturas práticas e sociais da existência não parecem ser suficientes para a manifestação de enfermidades mentais; e 3. Sustento que as perturbações na observância às normas são intimamente ligadas à experiência da enfermidade, mas apenas como consequência destas. Em seguida, introduzo uma abordagem relativa à autocompre-ensão mentalmente enferma prévia à tematização dos distúrbios de observância às normas. Sugiro que uma perturbação no espaço modal da experiência causada por mudanças afetivas tem um papel importante na compreensão da enfermidade mental a partir da perspectiva fe-nomenológico-existencial.Associação de Pesquisas em Fenomenologia (APFeno)2021-04-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoTextoapplication/pdfhttps://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/78Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2021): Dossiê Especial F. J. J. Buytendijk; 135-143Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; Vol. 2 Núm. 1 (2021): Dossiê Especial F. J. J. Buytendijk; 135-143Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; v. 2 n. 1 (2021): Dossiê Especial F. J. J. Buytendijk; 135-1432675-4673reponame:Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciencesinstname:Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR)instacron:UFPRenghttps://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/78/66Copyright (c) 2021 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciencesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLopes, Marcelo Vieira2024-04-15T18:40:47Zoai:phenomenology.com.br:article/78Revistahttps://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phePUBhttps://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/index/oaicontato@phenomenology.com.br || aholanda@yahoo.com2675-46732675-4673opendoar:2024-04-15T18:40:47Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences - Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology ¿Herramienta rota o existencia desordenada? El problema de la enfermedad mental en la fenomenología existencial Ferramenta Quebrada ou Existência Desordenada? O Problema da Enfermidade Mental na Fenomenologia Existencial |
title |
Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology |
spellingShingle |
Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology Lopes, Marcelo Vieira Psiquiatria Heidegger Sentimentos Existenciais Normatividade Psychiatry Heidegger Existential feelings Normativity Psiquiatría Heidegger Sentimientos existenciales Normatividad |
title_short |
Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology |
title_full |
Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology |
title_fullStr |
Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology |
title_full_unstemmed |
Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology |
title_sort |
Broken Tool or Disordered Existence? The Problem of Mental Illness in Existencial Phenomenology |
author |
Lopes, Marcelo Vieira |
author_facet |
Lopes, Marcelo Vieira |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lopes, Marcelo Vieira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Psiquiatria Heidegger Sentimentos Existenciais Normatividade Psychiatry Heidegger Existential feelings Normativity Psiquiatría Heidegger Sentimientos existenciales Normatividad |
topic |
Psiquiatria Heidegger Sentimentos Existenciais Normatividade Psychiatry Heidegger Existential feelings Normativity Psiquiatría Heidegger Sentimientos existenciales Normatividad |
description |
According to Schmid (2018) Martin Heidegger’s existential phenomenology pro-vides an accurate way to describe mental illness from an experiential point of view. Mental illness is addressed as a series of disruptions in the practical and social structures of existen-ce, by analogy with the broken tool analysis as presented in Being and Time. In this paper, I propose an analysis of Schmid’s reading in three steps: 1. I maintain that her reading implies both a categorial transgression and a functionalist perspective, both of which derive from the mistaken use of the broken tool analogy; 2. Disruptions in the practical and social structures of existence do not seem sufficient for the manifestation of mental illness; and 3. I maintain that rule-following disturbances are closely linked to the experience of illness, but just as a conse-quence of that experience. Next, I introduce an approach to the mentally ill self-understanding prior to the thematization of rule-following disturbances. I conclude by suggesting that a dis-ruption in the modal space of experience linked to affective changes plays an important role in understanding mental illness from an existential-phenomenological perspective. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-04-22 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto Texto Texto |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/78 |
url |
https://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/78 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/78/66 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação de Pesquisas em Fenomenologia (APFeno) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação de Pesquisas em Fenomenologia (APFeno) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2021): Dossiê Especial F. J. J. Buytendijk; 135-143 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; Vol. 2 Núm. 1 (2021): Dossiê Especial F. J. J. Buytendijk; 135-143 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; v. 2 n. 1 (2021): Dossiê Especial F. J. J. Buytendijk; 135-143 2675-4673 reponame:Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences instname:Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) instacron:UFPR |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) |
instacron_str |
UFPR |
institution |
UFPR |
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Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences |
collection |
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences - Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
contato@phenomenology.com.br || aholanda@yahoo.com |
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