TORT LAW, JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL REGIME: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE WELFARE STATE AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

• Autor(a) principal: Zanitelli, Leandro Martins
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Revista da Faculdade de Direito UFPR (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.ufpr.br/direito/article/view/38089
• topic: Economic democracy. Externalities. Justice. Tort law. Welfare state.; Direito; Direito Civil; Democracia econômica. Estado de bem-estar. Externalidades. Justiça. Responsabilidade civil.

The paper distinguishes two types of institutional regime, welfare state and economic democracy, and attempts to determine which tort rules are most suited to each one of them. It argues in favor of two central claims, namely, that a tendency for the adoption of strict liability rules in Brazilian law coheres with welfare state’s capitalist way of production, and that strict liability rules are also required by economic democracy, a kind of institutional regime in which the problem of externalities, though probably minored, still exists. In so doing, the paper also illustrates a (“indirect”) way of examining issues of private law through the lens of justice, which consists in first electing the type of institutional regime most prone to the realization of the principles of justice and inquiring thereafter about which rules of private law are fitted for that regime.