Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Oliveira, Marcio Francisco Teixeira de
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/972
Resumo: This paper aims to present Ferdinand Alquié's rejection of Spinoza's monism. Unlike Descartes, who sustains dualism, the monist thesis determines that there can be only one substance constituted by infinite attributes. This thesis is fundamental for the consolidation of the entire philosophical system of Spinoza. Alquié concludes that the monist thesis is incompatible with the argumentative structure of the first book of the Ethics. Alquié's approach is important because it exposes the problem very clearly, which justifies the presentation of his thinking, that can be useful to those who are interested in the studies of Spinoza's philosophy.
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spelling Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monismFerdinand Alquié contra o monismo de EspinosaEspinosa; Alquié; Monismo; Substância; Atributo.Spinoza; Alquié; Monism; Substance; Attribute.This paper aims to present Ferdinand Alquié's rejection of Spinoza's monism. Unlike Descartes, who sustains dualism, the monist thesis determines that there can be only one substance constituted by infinite attributes. This thesis is fundamental for the consolidation of the entire philosophical system of Spinoza. Alquié concludes that the monist thesis is incompatible with the argumentative structure of the first book of the Ethics. Alquié's approach is important because it exposes the problem very clearly, which justifies the presentation of his thinking, that can be useful to those who are interested in the studies of Spinoza's philosophy.Este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a rejeição de Ferdinand Alquié à tese do monismo de Espinosa. Diferentemente de Descartes, que sustenta o dualismo, a tese do monismo determina que só pode existir uma única substância constituída de infinitos atributos. Esta tese é fundamental para a consolidação de todo o sistema filosófico de Espinosa. Alquié conclui que a tese do monismo é incompatível com a estrutura argumentativa do primeiro livro da Ética. A abordagem de Alquié é importante porque expõe o problema de maneira muito clara, razão pela qual a apresentação de seu pensamento pode ser útil àqueles que se interessam pelos estudos da filosofia de Espinosa.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2018-12-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/97210.31977/grirfi.v18i2.972Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 18 n. 2 (2018); 72-852178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/972/578Copyright (c) 2018 Marcio Francisco Teixeira de Oliveirainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessOliveira, Marcio Francisco Teixeira de2020-06-30T18:14:28Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/972Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2020-06-30T18:14:28Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism
Ferdinand Alquié contra o monismo de Espinosa
title Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism
spellingShingle Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism
Oliveira, Marcio Francisco Teixeira de
Espinosa; Alquié; Monismo; Substância; Atributo.
Spinoza; Alquié; Monism; Substance; Attribute.
title_short Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism
title_full Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism
title_fullStr Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism
title_full_unstemmed Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism
title_sort Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza’s monism
author Oliveira, Marcio Francisco Teixeira de
author_facet Oliveira, Marcio Francisco Teixeira de
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Oliveira, Marcio Francisco Teixeira de
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Espinosa; Alquié; Monismo; Substância; Atributo.
Spinoza; Alquié; Monism; Substance; Attribute.
topic Espinosa; Alquié; Monismo; Substância; Atributo.
Spinoza; Alquié; Monism; Substance; Attribute.
description This paper aims to present Ferdinand Alquié's rejection of Spinoza's monism. Unlike Descartes, who sustains dualism, the monist thesis determines that there can be only one substance constituted by infinite attributes. This thesis is fundamental for the consolidation of the entire philosophical system of Spinoza. Alquié concludes that the monist thesis is incompatible with the argumentative structure of the first book of the Ethics. Alquié's approach is important because it exposes the problem very clearly, which justifies the presentation of his thinking, that can be useful to those who are interested in the studies of Spinoza's philosophy.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-16
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-Reviewed
Evaluados por los pares
Avaliados pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/972
10.31977/grirfi.v18i2.972
url http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/972
identifier_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v18i2.972
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/972/578
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Marcio Francisco Teixeira de Oliveira
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Marcio Francisco Teixeira de Oliveira
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 18 n. 2 (2018); 72-85
2178-1036
reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia
instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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instname_str Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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reponame_str Griot : Revista de Filosofia
collection Griot : Revista de Filosofia
repository.name.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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