Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
Texto Completo: | http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/765 |
Resumo: | The present work is focused on the epistemological investigation about the relation between Nonconceptual Self, nonconceptual content of perception, awarenes and recognition of place in the context of the Gibsonian ecological perspective. In view of this investigative purpose our objectives are the following: 1 - to characterize the nonconceptual content of perception in the anti-representationalist context and 2 - to question whether consciousness is necessary for organisms to act in the environment and to acquire perceptual experiences such as the recognition of place. In the context of Gibsonian perspective, we will argue in support of the hypothesis that the ecological-informational and anti-representationalist theory of perception offers innovative theoretical subsidies for the analysis of our research purpose. We understand that in order to have awareness and to be able to think about oneself, the agent must first have basic perceptual experiences of the environment. We consider that the agent's basic perceptual experiences, such as recognition of place, does not necessarily involve consciousness. |
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Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of placeSelf e conteúdo não conceitual da percepção: a perspectiva anti-representacionista acerca da experiência perceptiva do reconhecimento de lugarProntidão para ação; Self não conceitual; Conteúdo não conceitual; Percepção-ação; Informação.Awareness; Nonconceptual Self; Nonconceptual content; Perception-action; Information.The present work is focused on the epistemological investigation about the relation between Nonconceptual Self, nonconceptual content of perception, awarenes and recognition of place in the context of the Gibsonian ecological perspective. In view of this investigative purpose our objectives are the following: 1 - to characterize the nonconceptual content of perception in the anti-representationalist context and 2 - to question whether consciousness is necessary for organisms to act in the environment and to acquire perceptual experiences such as the recognition of place. In the context of Gibsonian perspective, we will argue in support of the hypothesis that the ecological-informational and anti-representationalist theory of perception offers innovative theoretical subsidies for the analysis of our research purpose. We understand that in order to have awareness and to be able to think about oneself, the agent must first have basic perceptual experiences of the environment. We consider that the agent's basic perceptual experiences, such as recognition of place, does not necessarily involve consciousness. O presente trabalho está voltado à investigação epistemológica acerca da relação entre Self não conceitual, conteúdo não conceitual da percepção, prontidão para ação (awareness) e reconhecimento de lugar, no contexto da perspectiva ecológica gibsoniana. Tendo em vista este propósito investigativo, nossos objetivos são: 1- caracterizar o conteúdo não conceitual da percepção no contexto anti-representacionista e 2 - questionar se é necessário a consciência para os organismos agirem no ambiente e adquirirem experiências perceptivas como o reconhecimento de lugar. Argumentaremos em defesa da hipótese de que a teoria ecológico-informacional e anti-representacionista da percepção, com raízes gibsonianas, oferece subsídios teóricos inovadores para a análise do nosso propósito investigativo. Entendemos que para ter consciência e capacidade de pensar sobre si mesmo, o agente tem que, primeiramente, ter experiências perceptivas básicas do ambiente. Consideramos que essas experiências perceptivas básicas do agente, como o reconhecimento de lugar, não envolvem necessariamente a consciência.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2017-12-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/76510.31977/grirfi.v16i2.765Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 16 n. 2 (2017); 285-3022178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/765/480Copyright (c) 2017 Juliana Moroniinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMoroni, Juliana2020-06-30T18:15:30Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/765Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2020-06-30T18:15:30Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place Self e conteúdo não conceitual da percepção: a perspectiva anti-representacionista acerca da experiência perceptiva do reconhecimento de lugar |
title |
Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place |
spellingShingle |
Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place Moroni, Juliana Prontidão para ação; Self não conceitual; Conteúdo não conceitual; Percepção-ação; Informação. Awareness; Nonconceptual Self; Nonconceptual content; Perception-action; Information. |
title_short |
Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place |
title_full |
Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place |
title_fullStr |
Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place |
title_full_unstemmed |
Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place |
title_sort |
Self and nonconceptual content of perception: the antirepresentationist perspective on the perceptive experience of recognition of place |
author |
Moroni, Juliana |
author_facet |
Moroni, Juliana |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Moroni, Juliana |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Prontidão para ação; Self não conceitual; Conteúdo não conceitual; Percepção-ação; Informação. Awareness; Nonconceptual Self; Nonconceptual content; Perception-action; Information. |
topic |
Prontidão para ação; Self não conceitual; Conteúdo não conceitual; Percepção-ação; Informação. Awareness; Nonconceptual Self; Nonconceptual content; Perception-action; Information. |
description |
The present work is focused on the epistemological investigation about the relation between Nonconceptual Self, nonconceptual content of perception, awarenes and recognition of place in the context of the Gibsonian ecological perspective. In view of this investigative purpose our objectives are the following: 1 - to characterize the nonconceptual content of perception in the anti-representationalist context and 2 - to question whether consciousness is necessary for organisms to act in the environment and to acquire perceptual experiences such as the recognition of place. In the context of Gibsonian perspective, we will argue in support of the hypothesis that the ecological-informational and anti-representationalist theory of perception offers innovative theoretical subsidies for the analysis of our research purpose. We understand that in order to have awareness and to be able to think about oneself, the agent must first have basic perceptual experiences of the environment. We consider that the agent's basic perceptual experiences, such as recognition of place, does not necessarily involve consciousness. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-12-18 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-Reviewed Evaluados por los pares Avaliados pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/765 10.31977/grirfi.v16i2.765 |
url |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/765 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v16i2.765 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/765/480 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Juliana Moroni info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Juliana Moroni |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 16 n. 2 (2017); 285-302 2178-1036 reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) instacron:UFRB |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
instacron_str |
UFRB |
institution |
UFRB |
reponame_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
collection |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||griotrevista@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1754732699152547840 |