Enactivism and practical knowledge

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Benevides Barbosa Gomes, Rodrigo
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1296
Resumo: In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger claims the primordial knowledge of Dasein comes from coping with mundane beings. Merleau-Ponty, in turn, argues on Phenomenology of Perception (1945) for knowledge as a bodily activity non translatable in propositional terms. Later, on What Computers Can’t Do (1972), Hubert Dreyfus use the work of both to point out the flaws of cognitivism, the dominant paradigm in early days of artificial intelligence. Finally, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991) by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch brings enactivism as an attempt to take from cognitivism and connectionism the hegemony in cognitive sciences. That being said, the paper describes enactivism while showing its phenomenological heritage.
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spelling Enactivism and practical knowledgeEnativismo e conhecimento práticoEnativismo; Fenomenologia; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela.Enactivism; Phenomenology; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela.In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger claims the primordial knowledge of Dasein comes from coping with mundane beings. Merleau-Ponty, in turn, argues on Phenomenology of Perception (1945) for knowledge as a bodily activity non translatable in propositional terms. Later, on What Computers Can’t Do (1972), Hubert Dreyfus use the work of both to point out the flaws of cognitivism, the dominant paradigm in early days of artificial intelligence. Finally, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991) by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch brings enactivism as an attempt to take from cognitivism and connectionism the hegemony in cognitive sciences. That being said, the paper describes enactivism while showing its phenomenological heritage.Em Ser e Tempo (1927), Heidegger argumenta que o conhecimento primordial do Dasein se dá no manuseio de entes mundanos. Merleau-Ponty, por sua vez, descreve na Fenomenologia da Percepção (1945) que o conhecimento é, antes de tudo, uma intencionalidade corporal intraduzível em termos proposicionais. Mais tarde, em What Computers Can’t Do (1972), Hubert Dreyfus usa a obra de ambos para apontar os equívocos do paradigma cognitivista, isto é, a abordagem dominante do então nascente campo da inteligência artificial. Finalmente, em The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991), a noção de enativismo - elaborada por Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson e Eleanor Rosch - surge como uma tentativa de tomar do cognitivismo e do conexionismo a hegemonia nas ciências cognitivas. Dito isso, o objetivo do artigo consiste em descrever o enativismo e apontar sua herança fenomenológica.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2019-10-15info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/129610.31977/grirfi.v19i3.1296Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 19 n. 3 (2019); 12-222178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1296/760Copyright (c) 2019 Rodrigo Benevides Barbosa Gomesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBenevides Barbosa Gomes, Rodrigo2020-06-30T18:13:48Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/1296Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2020-06-30T18:13:48Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Enactivism and practical knowledge
Enativismo e conhecimento prático
title Enactivism and practical knowledge
spellingShingle Enactivism and practical knowledge
Benevides Barbosa Gomes, Rodrigo
Enativismo; Fenomenologia; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela.
Enactivism; Phenomenology; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela.
title_short Enactivism and practical knowledge
title_full Enactivism and practical knowledge
title_fullStr Enactivism and practical knowledge
title_full_unstemmed Enactivism and practical knowledge
title_sort Enactivism and practical knowledge
author Benevides Barbosa Gomes, Rodrigo
author_facet Benevides Barbosa Gomes, Rodrigo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Benevides Barbosa Gomes, Rodrigo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Enativismo; Fenomenologia; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela.
Enactivism; Phenomenology; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela.
topic Enativismo; Fenomenologia; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela.
Enactivism; Phenomenology; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela.
description In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger claims the primordial knowledge of Dasein comes from coping with mundane beings. Merleau-Ponty, in turn, argues on Phenomenology of Perception (1945) for knowledge as a bodily activity non translatable in propositional terms. Later, on What Computers Can’t Do (1972), Hubert Dreyfus use the work of both to point out the flaws of cognitivism, the dominant paradigm in early days of artificial intelligence. Finally, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991) by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch brings enactivism as an attempt to take from cognitivism and connectionism the hegemony in cognitive sciences. That being said, the paper describes enactivism while showing its phenomenological heritage.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-10-15
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-Reviewed
Evaluados por los pares
Avaliados pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1296
10.31977/grirfi.v19i3.1296
url http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1296
identifier_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v19i3.1296
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1296/760
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 Rodrigo Benevides Barbosa Gomes
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 Rodrigo Benevides Barbosa Gomes
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 19 n. 3 (2019); 12-22
2178-1036
reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia
instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
instacron:UFRB
instname_str Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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reponame_str Griot : Revista de Filosofia
collection Griot : Revista de Filosofia
repository.name.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||griotrevista@gmail.com
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