Two concepts and two problems of consciousness

• Autor(a) principal: Júnior, José Gladstone Almeida
• Data de Publicação: 2014
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
• DOI: 10.31977/grirfi.v9i1.577
• Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/577
• topic: Filosofia da mente; Consciência; Problema difícil da consciência.; Philosophy of mind; Consciousness; Hard problem of consciousness.

Certainly consciousness is something extremely familiar and, at the same time, enigmatic for us. Its phenomenal aspect, called phenomenal consciousness, imposes a number of barriers to reductionists approaches proposed by physicist/functionalist framework. Such are the difficulties raised by phenomenal consciousness to that reductionists approaches that the problems concerning that aspect of consciousness are the “hard problem of consciousness”. Thus, this paper has three aims: first of all, to demonstrate the necessity to distinguish two concepts concerning to two different aspects of consciousness; posteriorly, as consequence of distinction between two concepts of consciousness, will be exposed the problems related to both concepts; finally, we will advocate about the existence of an explanatory gap between explanations derived from reductionists theories and the phenomenal consciousness.