Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Silva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
DOI: 10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1774
Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1774
Resumo: In his second philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein offers a method by examples with intents of finally solving the philosophical problems. According to Wittgenstein, instead of searching for an essence that defines concepts, as Socrates demanded from his interlocutors, philosophers should show examples for concepts, thus responding to tradicional philosophical questions such as “What is knowledge?”, “What is friendship?”, “What is fair?”. This article argues that Wittgenstein’s method by examples could never solve for once philosophical problems, because people are different and, therefore, offer different examples for concepts, making it impossible to identify objectively the right and wrong examples. In addition, it analyses the fact that Wittgenstein disregarded such hindrance to the success of his method while formulating it. Furthermore, this work reiterates philosophers’ duty to search for the essence defining concepts.
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spelling Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examplesConsiderações sobre o método por exemplos de Ludwig WittgensteinLudwig Wittgenstein; Método por exemplos; Investigações filosóficas; Sócrates; Maiêutica.Ludwig Wittgenstein; Method by examples; Philosophical investigations; Socrates; Maieutics.In his second philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein offers a method by examples with intents of finally solving the philosophical problems. According to Wittgenstein, instead of searching for an essence that defines concepts, as Socrates demanded from his interlocutors, philosophers should show examples for concepts, thus responding to tradicional philosophical questions such as “What is knowledge?”, “What is friendship?”, “What is fair?”. This article argues that Wittgenstein’s method by examples could never solve for once philosophical problems, because people are different and, therefore, offer different examples for concepts, making it impossible to identify objectively the right and wrong examples. In addition, it analyses the fact that Wittgenstein disregarded such hindrance to the success of his method while formulating it. Furthermore, this work reiterates philosophers’ duty to search for the essence defining concepts.Em sua segunda filosofia, Ludwig Wittgenstein apresenta um método por exemplos com o intuito de resolver de vez os problemas filosóficos. De acordo com Wittgenstein, em vez de buscar a essência definidora dos conceitos, como Sócrates demandava de seus interlocutores, caberia aos filósofos dar exemplos dos conceitos a fim de responder às questões tradicionais da filosofia, como “O que é o conhecimento?”, “O que é a amizade?”, “O que é o justo?”. Neste artigo, não apenas se argumenta que o método por exemplos de Wittgenstein nunca poderia resolver de vez os problemas filosóficos porque diferentes pessoas dão diferentes exemplos de um conceito, sendo impossível decidir objetivamente quais são os exemplos certos e quais são os exemplos errados, como se analisa o fato de que Wittgenstein desconsiderou esse empecilho ao sucesso de seu método ao elaborá-lo. Além disso, reitera-se neste texto o dever dos filósofos de buscar a essência definidora dos conceitos.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2020-06-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/177410.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1774Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (2020); 140-1532178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1774/1041Copyright (c) 2020 Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silvahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca2020-10-03T21:00:39Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/1774Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2020-10-03T21:00:39Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
Considerações sobre o método por exemplos de Ludwig Wittgenstein
title Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
spellingShingle Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
Silva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca
Ludwig Wittgenstein; Método por exemplos; Investigações filosóficas; Sócrates; Maiêutica.
Ludwig Wittgenstein; Method by examples; Philosophical investigations; Socrates; Maieutics.
Silva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca
Ludwig Wittgenstein; Método por exemplos; Investigações filosóficas; Sócrates; Maiêutica.
Ludwig Wittgenstein; Method by examples; Philosophical investigations; Socrates; Maieutics.
title_short Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
title_full Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
title_fullStr Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
title_full_unstemmed Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
title_sort Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s method by examples
author Silva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca
author_facet Silva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca
Silva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Silva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Ludwig Wittgenstein; Método por exemplos; Investigações filosóficas; Sócrates; Maiêutica.
Ludwig Wittgenstein; Method by examples; Philosophical investigations; Socrates; Maieutics.
topic Ludwig Wittgenstein; Método por exemplos; Investigações filosóficas; Sócrates; Maiêutica.
Ludwig Wittgenstein; Method by examples; Philosophical investigations; Socrates; Maieutics.
description In his second philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein offers a method by examples with intents of finally solving the philosophical problems. According to Wittgenstein, instead of searching for an essence that defines concepts, as Socrates demanded from his interlocutors, philosophers should show examples for concepts, thus responding to tradicional philosophical questions such as “What is knowledge?”, “What is friendship?”, “What is fair?”. This article argues that Wittgenstein’s method by examples could never solve for once philosophical problems, because people are different and, therefore, offer different examples for concepts, making it impossible to identify objectively the right and wrong examples. In addition, it analyses the fact that Wittgenstein disregarded such hindrance to the success of his method while formulating it. Furthermore, this work reiterates philosophers’ duty to search for the essence defining concepts.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-06-12
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-Reviewed
Evaluados por los pares
Avaliados pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1774
10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1774
url http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1774
identifier_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1774
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1774/1041
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (2020); 140-153
2178-1036
reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia
instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
instacron:UFRB
instname_str Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
instacron_str UFRB
institution UFRB
reponame_str Griot : Revista de Filosofia
collection Griot : Revista de Filosofia
repository.name.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||griotrevista@gmail.com
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1774

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