The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
Texto Completo: | http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1449 |
Resumo: | The philosophical interest in relation to the affective dimension of human life and experience is growing and plural. Among these interests are the recent and varied efforts to understand the nature of emotions, especially in relation to various philosophical issues involving human agency. In line with these efforts, Goldie's (2007) proposal consists of a double movement of, on the one hand, presenting a wide and varied set of phenomena that need to be appreciated by any theories of emotion, and, on the other, identifying the extent to which the most prestigious theories of emotion do justice to that richness and phenomenal complexity. The result of this double movement is the critical diagnosis that the hitherto most prestigious theories of emotion, the non-cognitivist, the cognitivist, and the perceptual are deficient from an explanatory point of view. Interestingly, although Martin Heidegger has reserved a decisive position and function for affectivity amidst the project of elaborating fundamental ontology, it is not included in the minutes of much of the current debate on the philosophies of emotion, including the aforementioned critical diagnosis. from Goldie. The main objective of this paper is to present in general the phenomenology of affectivity as unfolded by Heidegger in the late twenties. More specifically, it seeks to show how the affective dimension in general, and mood and emotions in particular, have an eminently revealing openness, which even justifies, from a meta-philosophical perspective, their inclusion in the fundamental ontology program. |
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The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and timeA dimensão afetiva da existência humana à luz da fenomenologia hermenêutica: o caráter revelador das emoções em Ser e TempoAfetividade; Emoção; Humor; Fenomenologia; Heidegger.Afectivity; Emotion; Mood; Phenomenology; Heidegger.The philosophical interest in relation to the affective dimension of human life and experience is growing and plural. Among these interests are the recent and varied efforts to understand the nature of emotions, especially in relation to various philosophical issues involving human agency. In line with these efforts, Goldie's (2007) proposal consists of a double movement of, on the one hand, presenting a wide and varied set of phenomena that need to be appreciated by any theories of emotion, and, on the other, identifying the extent to which the most prestigious theories of emotion do justice to that richness and phenomenal complexity. The result of this double movement is the critical diagnosis that the hitherto most prestigious theories of emotion, the non-cognitivist, the cognitivist, and the perceptual are deficient from an explanatory point of view. Interestingly, although Martin Heidegger has reserved a decisive position and function for affectivity amidst the project of elaborating fundamental ontology, it is not included in the minutes of much of the current debate on the philosophies of emotion, including the aforementioned critical diagnosis. from Goldie. The main objective of this paper is to present in general the phenomenology of affectivity as unfolded by Heidegger in the late twenties. More specifically, it seeks to show how the affective dimension in general, and mood and emotions in particular, have an eminently revealing openness, which even justifies, from a meta-philosophical perspective, their inclusion in the fundamental ontology program.É crescente e plural o interesse filosófico em relação à dimensão afetiva da vida e da experiência humana. Dentre estes interesses destacam-se os recentes e variados esforços em compreender a natureza das emoções, especialmente em sua relação com diversas questões filosóficas envolvendo a agência humana. Na linha destes esforços soma-se a proposta de Goldie (2007) que consiste em um duplo movimento de, por um lado, apresentar um amplo e variado conjunto de fenômenos que precisam ser apreciados por quaisquer teorias da emoção, e, por outro, identificar em que medida as teorias da emoção mais prestigiadas fazem justiça àquela riqueza e complexidade fenomênica. O resultado deste duplo movimento é o diagnóstico crítico de que as teorias da emoção até então mais prestigiadas, a não-cognitivista, a cognitivista e a perceptual são deficitárias desde o ponto de vista explicativo. Curiosamente, apesar de ter reservado uma posição e função decisivas para a afetividade em meio ao projeto de elaboração da ontologia fundamental, o nome de Martin Heidegger não consta nas atas de boa parte dos atuais debates das filosofias da emoção, inclusive no já mencionado diagnóstico crítico de Goldie. O objetivo central deste trabalho consiste em apresentar em linhas gerais a fenomenologia da afetividade conforme desdobrada por Heidegger ao final da década de vinte. Mais especificamente, procura-se mostrar de que maneira a dimensão afetiva em geral, e o humor e as emoções em particular, possuem um caráter de abertura eminentemente revelador, o que inclusive justifica, desde uma perspectiva meta-filosófica, a sua inclusão junto ao programa da ontologia fundamental.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2020-02-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/144910.31977/grirfi.v20i1.1449Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 1 (2020); 51-602178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1449/965Copyright (c) 2020 Gabriel Henrique Dietrichinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDietrich, Gabriel Henrique2020-06-30T18:13:29Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/1449Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2020-06-30T18:13:29Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time A dimensão afetiva da existência humana à luz da fenomenologia hermenêutica: o caráter revelador das emoções em Ser e Tempo |
title |
The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time |
spellingShingle |
The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time Dietrich, Gabriel Henrique Afetividade; Emoção; Humor; Fenomenologia; Heidegger. Afectivity; Emotion; Mood; Phenomenology; Heidegger. |
title_short |
The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time |
title_full |
The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time |
title_fullStr |
The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time |
title_full_unstemmed |
The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time |
title_sort |
The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time |
author |
Dietrich, Gabriel Henrique |
author_facet |
Dietrich, Gabriel Henrique |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Dietrich, Gabriel Henrique |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Afetividade; Emoção; Humor; Fenomenologia; Heidegger. Afectivity; Emotion; Mood; Phenomenology; Heidegger. |
topic |
Afetividade; Emoção; Humor; Fenomenologia; Heidegger. Afectivity; Emotion; Mood; Phenomenology; Heidegger. |
description |
The philosophical interest in relation to the affective dimension of human life and experience is growing and plural. Among these interests are the recent and varied efforts to understand the nature of emotions, especially in relation to various philosophical issues involving human agency. In line with these efforts, Goldie's (2007) proposal consists of a double movement of, on the one hand, presenting a wide and varied set of phenomena that need to be appreciated by any theories of emotion, and, on the other, identifying the extent to which the most prestigious theories of emotion do justice to that richness and phenomenal complexity. The result of this double movement is the critical diagnosis that the hitherto most prestigious theories of emotion, the non-cognitivist, the cognitivist, and the perceptual are deficient from an explanatory point of view. Interestingly, although Martin Heidegger has reserved a decisive position and function for affectivity amidst the project of elaborating fundamental ontology, it is not included in the minutes of much of the current debate on the philosophies of emotion, including the aforementioned critical diagnosis. from Goldie. The main objective of this paper is to present in general the phenomenology of affectivity as unfolded by Heidegger in the late twenties. More specifically, it seeks to show how the affective dimension in general, and mood and emotions in particular, have an eminently revealing openness, which even justifies, from a meta-philosophical perspective, their inclusion in the fundamental ontology program. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-02-12 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-Reviewed Evaluados por los pares Avaliados pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1449 10.31977/grirfi.v20i1.1449 |
url |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1449 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v20i1.1449 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1449/965 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Gabriel Henrique Dietrich info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Gabriel Henrique Dietrich |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 1 (2020); 51-60 2178-1036 reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) instacron:UFRB |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
instacron_str |
UFRB |
institution |
UFRB |
reponame_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
collection |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||griotrevista@gmail.com |
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