Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida"
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UFRGS |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10183/195645 |
Resumo: | Abstract. In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim seems to open up the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. |
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Carvalho, Eros Moreira de2019-06-12T02:31:41Z20181414-4247http://hdl.handle.net/10183/195645001089531Abstract. In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim seems to open up the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates.application/pdfporPrincipia : revista internacional de epistemologia. Florianópolis, SC. Vol. 22, n. 3 (dez. 2018), p. [439]-460Goodman, Nelson, 1906-1998. Fact, fiction and forecast - Fato, ficção e previsãoIndução (Filosofia)Definição (Filosofia)FilosofiaNelson Goodmanthe new riddle of inductionjustificationreflective equilibriumconstructional definitionGoodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida"Goodman and the project of a constructional definition of "valid induction" info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRGSinstname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)instacron:UFRGSTEXT001089531.pdf.txt001089531.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain70319http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/195645/2/001089531.pdf.txtb90fdd0bdba6f7a12d1afcb759b71e38MD52ORIGINAL001089531.pdfTexto completoapplication/pdf188894http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/195645/1/001089531.pdff1ddebd55a007c065ee3187de7155eadMD5110183/1956452023-09-21 03:39:03.202634oai:www.lume.ufrgs.br:10183/195645Repositório de PublicaçõesPUBhttps://lume.ufrgs.br/oai/requestopendoar:2023-09-21T06:39:03Repositório Institucional da UFRGS - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)false |
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida" |
dc.title.alternative.en.fl_str_mv |
Goodman and the project of a constructional definition of "valid induction" |
title |
Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida" |
spellingShingle |
Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida" Carvalho, Eros Moreira de Goodman, Nelson, 1906-1998. Fact, fiction and forecast - Fato, ficção e previsão Indução (Filosofia) Definição (Filosofia) Filosofia Nelson Goodman the new riddle of induction justification reflective equilibrium constructional definition |
title_short |
Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida" |
title_full |
Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida" |
title_fullStr |
Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida" |
title_full_unstemmed |
Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida" |
title_sort |
Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de "indução válida" |
author |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
author_facet |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Goodman, Nelson, 1906-1998. Fact, fiction and forecast - Fato, ficção e previsão Indução (Filosofia) Definição (Filosofia) Filosofia |
topic |
Goodman, Nelson, 1906-1998. Fact, fiction and forecast - Fato, ficção e previsão Indução (Filosofia) Definição (Filosofia) Filosofia Nelson Goodman the new riddle of induction justification reflective equilibrium constructional definition |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Nelson Goodman the new riddle of induction justification reflective equilibrium constructional definition |
description |
Abstract. In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim seems to open up the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. |
publishDate |
2018 |
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2018 |
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2019-06-12T02:31:41Z |
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Principia : revista internacional de epistemologia. Florianópolis, SC. Vol. 22, n. 3 (dez. 2018), p. [439]-460 |
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