Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Reyes Barros, Joaquín
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea
Texto Completo: https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/8653
Resumo: ABSTRACT:This paper attempts to draw the attention to the role of persuasive authority in the law, by providing a critical review of Frederick Schauer's influential account of persuasive authorities as optional authorities. Although recognizing that Schauer highlights some important features of the notion, it is argued that, as long as his interpretation leaves no room for theoretical authority in the law, it fails to account properly for one of the main roles of persuasive authorities, namely, to provide future courts with reasons to distinguish their case from previous court's decisions. It is also suggested that persuasive authorities are best understood as theoretical authorities providing practical reasons. The article concludes with some final remarks on the consequences of the adopted view for our understanding of the law in general.RESUMO:Este artigo tenta chamar a atenção sobre o papel da autoridade persuasiva na lei, fornecendo uma revisão crítica da influente explicação de Frederick Schauer de autoridades persuasivas como autoridades opcionais. Embora reconhecendo que Schauer destaca algumas características importantes da noção, argumenta-se que, enquanto sua interpretação não deixa espaço para a autoridade teórica na lei, ela não leva em conta adequadamente um dos papéis principais das autoridades persuasivas, a saber, fornecer aos futuros tribunais razões para distinguir o seu caso das decisões dos tribunais anteriores. Sugere-se também que as autoridades persuasivas sejam melhor entendidas como autoridades teóricas fornecendo razões práticas. O artigo conclui com algumas observações finais sobre as conseqüências da visão adotada para nossa compreensão da lei em geral. 
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spelling Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the lawPhilosophy of LawJurisprudence; Precedents; Persuasive Authority; Non-binding Precedents; Teoria do direito; Argumentação; Precedentes; Autoridade persuasiva; Precedentes não-vinculativosLegal TheoryABSTRACT:This paper attempts to draw the attention to the role of persuasive authority in the law, by providing a critical review of Frederick Schauer's influential account of persuasive authorities as optional authorities. Although recognizing that Schauer highlights some important features of the notion, it is argued that, as long as his interpretation leaves no room for theoretical authority in the law, it fails to account properly for one of the main roles of persuasive authorities, namely, to provide future courts with reasons to distinguish their case from previous court's decisions. It is also suggested that persuasive authorities are best understood as theoretical authorities providing practical reasons. The article concludes with some final remarks on the consequences of the adopted view for our understanding of the law in general.RESUMO:Este artigo tenta chamar a atenção sobre o papel da autoridade persuasiva na lei, fornecendo uma revisão crítica da influente explicação de Frederick Schauer de autoridades persuasivas como autoridades opcionais. Embora reconhecendo que Schauer destaca algumas características importantes da noção, argumenta-se que, enquanto sua interpretação não deixa espaço para a autoridade teórica na lei, ela não leva em conta adequadamente um dos papéis principais das autoridades persuasivas, a saber, fornecer aos futuros tribunais razões para distinguir o seu caso das decisões dos tribunais anteriores. Sugere-se também que as autoridades persuasivas sejam melhor entendidas como autoridades teóricas fornecendo razões práticas. O artigo conclui com algumas observações finais sobre as conseqüências da visão adotada para nossa compreensão da lei em geral. Programa de Posgrado en Derecho de la Universidad Federal de Rio de JaneiroCONICYT (Becas Chile de Magíster en el extranjero)Reyes Barros, Joaquín2017-07-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/865310.21875/tjc.v1i2.8653Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 1, n. 2 (2016); 194-213Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 1, n. 2 (2016); 194-213Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 1, n. 2 (2016); 194-2132526-046410.21875/tjc.v1i2reponame:Teoria Jurídica Contemporâneainstname:Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)instacron:UFRJenghttps://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/8653/8532/*ref*/ALLEN, Carleton Kemp. Law in the Making. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964./*ref*/ATIYAH, P. S. Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning. In MACCORMICK, Neil; BIRKS, Peter (eds.), The Legal Mind. Essays for Tony Honoré. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986./*ref*/BRONAUGH, Richard. Persuasive Precedent. In: GOLDSTEIN, Laurence (ed.), Precedent in Law, pp. 217-247. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987./*ref*/CHRISTODOULIDIS, Emilios. The Irrationality of Merciful Legal Judgement: Exclusionary Reasoning and the question of the particular. Law and Philosophy, vol. 18, pp. 215-241, 1999./*ref*/DUARTE D'ALMEIDA, Luíz; MICHELON, Cláudio. The Structure of Arguments by Analogy in Law. Argumentation, 2016./*ref*/FLANDERS, Chad. Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority. Oklahoma Law Review, vol. 62, n. 55, pp. 55-88, 2009./*ref*/GLENN, H. Patrick. Persuasive Authority. McGill Law Journal, vol. 32, n. 2, pp. 261-298, 1987./*ref*/HART, H. L. A. Legal and Moral Obligation. In: MELDEN, Abraham Irving, Essays on Moral Philosophy. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958./*ref*/HART, H. L. A. Essays on Bentham: Studies on Jurisprudence and Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982./*ref*/HOFFMANN, Leonard. Fairchild in Retrospect. The Advocates Quarterly, vol. 39, n. 3, pp. 257-271, 2012./*ref*/HOFFMANN, Leonard. Fairchild and After. In: BURROWS, Andrew; JOHNSTON, David; ZIMMERMANN, Reinhard (eds.), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013./*ref*/HOHFELD, Wesley Newcomb. Fundamental Legal Conceptions. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966./*ref*/KAGAN, Shelly. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989./*ref*/LAMOND, Grant. Do Precedents Create Rules?. Legal Theory, vol 11, n. 1, pp. 1-26, 2005./*ref*/LAMOND, Grant. Persuasive Authority in the Law. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, n. XVII, pp. 16-35, 2010./*ref*/MARKWICK, Paul. Law and Content-Independent Reasons. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 20, n. 4, pp. 579-596, 2000./*ref*/MARKWICK, Paul. Independent of Content. Legal Theory, vol. 9, pp. 43-61, 2003./*ref*/MARMOR, Andrei. Authorities and Persons. Legal Theory, vol. 1, pp. 345-349, 1995./*ref*/MICHELON, Cláudio. Being Apart from Reasons. The Role of Reasons in Public and Private Moral Decision-Making. Springer, 2006./*ref*/RAZ, Joseph. The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979./*ref*/RAZ, Joseph. Practical Reason and Norms. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990./*ref*/RAZ, Joseph, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception. Minnesota Law Review, vol. 90, pp. 1003-1044, 2006./*ref*/SCHAUER, Frederick. Playing by the Rules. A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992./*ref*/SCHAUER, Frederick. Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 24, n. 3, pp. 495-509, 1994./*ref*/SCHAUER, Frederick. Authority and Authorities. Virginia Law Review, n. 94, pp. 1931-1961, 2008./*ref*/SCHAUER, Frederick. Thinking Like a Lawyer. A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Cambridge, Massachusetts -- London, England: Harvard University Press, 2009./*ref*/SCIARAFFA, Stefan. On Content-Independent Reasons: It's not in the Name. Law and Philosophy, vol. 28, pp. 233-260, 2009./*ref*/SIMPSON, A. W. Brian. The ratio decidendi of a case and the doctrine of binding precedent. In: SIMPSON, A. W. Brian (ed.), Oxford essays in jurisprudence, pp. 148--175. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.Direitos autorais 2017 Joaquín Reyes Barrosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2017-12-19T23:26:20Zoai:www.revistas.ufrj.br:article/8653Revistahttps://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/indexPUBhttps://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/oaitjc.ppgd.ufrj@gmail.com || rodrigocarelli@direito.ufrj.br || maysasdeandrade@gmail.com2526-04642526-0464opendoar:2017-12-19T23:26:20Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law
title Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law
spellingShingle Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law
Reyes Barros, Joaquín
Philosophy of Law
Jurisprudence; Precedents; Persuasive Authority; Non-binding Precedents; Teoria do direito; Argumentação; Precedentes; Autoridade persuasiva; Precedentes não-vinculativos
Legal Theory
title_short Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law
title_full Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law
title_fullStr Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law
title_full_unstemmed Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law
title_sort Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law
author Reyes Barros, Joaquín
author_facet Reyes Barros, Joaquín
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv CONICYT (Becas Chile de Magíster en el extranjero)
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Reyes Barros, Joaquín
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Philosophy of Law
Jurisprudence; Precedents; Persuasive Authority; Non-binding Precedents; Teoria do direito; Argumentação; Precedentes; Autoridade persuasiva; Precedentes não-vinculativos
Legal Theory
topic Philosophy of Law
Jurisprudence; Precedents; Persuasive Authority; Non-binding Precedents; Teoria do direito; Argumentação; Precedentes; Autoridade persuasiva; Precedentes não-vinculativos
Legal Theory
description ABSTRACT:This paper attempts to draw the attention to the role of persuasive authority in the law, by providing a critical review of Frederick Schauer's influential account of persuasive authorities as optional authorities. Although recognizing that Schauer highlights some important features of the notion, it is argued that, as long as his interpretation leaves no room for theoretical authority in the law, it fails to account properly for one of the main roles of persuasive authorities, namely, to provide future courts with reasons to distinguish their case from previous court's decisions. It is also suggested that persuasive authorities are best understood as theoretical authorities providing practical reasons. The article concludes with some final remarks on the consequences of the adopted view for our understanding of the law in general.RESUMO:Este artigo tenta chamar a atenção sobre o papel da autoridade persuasiva na lei, fornecendo uma revisão crítica da influente explicação de Frederick Schauer de autoridades persuasivas como autoridades opcionais. Embora reconhecendo que Schauer destaca algumas características importantes da noção, argumenta-se que, enquanto sua interpretação não deixa espaço para a autoridade teórica na lei, ela não leva em conta adequadamente um dos papéis principais das autoridades persuasivas, a saber, fornecer aos futuros tribunais razões para distinguir o seu caso das decisões dos tribunais anteriores. Sugere-se também que as autoridades persuasivas sejam melhor entendidas como autoridades teóricas fornecendo razões práticas. O artigo conclui com algumas observações finais sobre as conseqüências da visão adotada para nossa compreensão da lei em geral. 
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-07-25
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/8653
10.21875/tjc.v1i2.8653
url https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/8653
identifier_str_mv 10.21875/tjc.v1i2.8653
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/8653/8532
/*ref*/ALLEN, Carleton Kemp. Law in the Making. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.
/*ref*/ATIYAH, P. S. Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning. In MACCORMICK, Neil; BIRKS, Peter (eds.), The Legal Mind. Essays for Tony Honoré. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
/*ref*/BRONAUGH, Richard. Persuasive Precedent. In: GOLDSTEIN, Laurence (ed.), Precedent in Law, pp. 217-247. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
/*ref*/CHRISTODOULIDIS, Emilios. The Irrationality of Merciful Legal Judgement: Exclusionary Reasoning and the question of the particular. Law and Philosophy, vol. 18, pp. 215-241, 1999.
/*ref*/DUARTE D'ALMEIDA, Luíz; MICHELON, Cláudio. The Structure of Arguments by Analogy in Law. Argumentation, 2016.
/*ref*/FLANDERS, Chad. Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority. Oklahoma Law Review, vol. 62, n. 55, pp. 55-88, 2009.
/*ref*/GLENN, H. Patrick. Persuasive Authority. McGill Law Journal, vol. 32, n. 2, pp. 261-298, 1987.
/*ref*/HART, H. L. A. Legal and Moral Obligation. In: MELDEN, Abraham Irving, Essays on Moral Philosophy. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958.
/*ref*/HART, H. L. A. Essays on Bentham: Studies on Jurisprudence and Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.
/*ref*/HOFFMANN, Leonard. Fairchild in Retrospect. The Advocates Quarterly, vol. 39, n. 3, pp. 257-271, 2012.
/*ref*/HOFFMANN, Leonard. Fairchild and After. In: BURROWS, Andrew; JOHNSTON, David; ZIMMERMANN, Reinhard (eds.), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
/*ref*/HOHFELD, Wesley Newcomb. Fundamental Legal Conceptions. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966.
/*ref*/KAGAN, Shelly. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
/*ref*/LAMOND, Grant. Do Precedents Create Rules?. Legal Theory, vol 11, n. 1, pp. 1-26, 2005.
/*ref*/LAMOND, Grant. Persuasive Authority in the Law. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, n. XVII, pp. 16-35, 2010.
/*ref*/MARKWICK, Paul. Law and Content-Independent Reasons. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 20, n. 4, pp. 579-596, 2000.
/*ref*/MARKWICK, Paul. Independent of Content. Legal Theory, vol. 9, pp. 43-61, 2003.
/*ref*/MARMOR, Andrei. Authorities and Persons. Legal Theory, vol. 1, pp. 345-349, 1995.
/*ref*/MICHELON, Cláudio. Being Apart from Reasons. The Role of Reasons in Public and Private Moral Decision-Making. Springer, 2006.
/*ref*/RAZ, Joseph. The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
/*ref*/RAZ, Joseph. Practical Reason and Norms. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990.
/*ref*/RAZ, Joseph, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception. Minnesota Law Review, vol. 90, pp. 1003-1044, 2006.
/*ref*/SCHAUER, Frederick. Playing by the Rules. A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
/*ref*/SCHAUER, Frederick. Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 24, n. 3, pp. 495-509, 1994.
/*ref*/SCHAUER, Frederick. Authority and Authorities. Virginia Law Review, n. 94, pp. 1931-1961, 2008.
/*ref*/SCHAUER, Frederick. Thinking Like a Lawyer. A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Cambridge, Massachusetts -- London, England: Harvard University Press, 2009.
/*ref*/SCIARAFFA, Stefan. On Content-Independent Reasons: It's not in the Name. Law and Philosophy, vol. 28, pp. 233-260, 2009.
/*ref*/SIMPSON, A. W. Brian. The ratio decidendi of a case and the doctrine of binding precedent. In: SIMPSON, A. W. Brian (ed.), Oxford essays in jurisprudence, pp. 148--175. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Direitos autorais 2017 Joaquín Reyes Barros
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Direitos autorais 2017 Joaquín Reyes Barros
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Programa de Posgrado en Derecho de la Universidad Federal de Rio de Janeiro
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Programa de Posgrado en Derecho de la Universidad Federal de Rio de Janeiro
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 1, n. 2 (2016); 194-213
Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 1, n. 2 (2016); 194-213
Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 1, n. 2 (2016); 194-213
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10.21875/tjc.v1i2
reponame:Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea
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