Tax aggressiveness in publicly traded companies operating in a regulated market

• Autor(a) principal: França, Thaís Salvatori
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Outros Autores: Bezerra, Francisco Antonio
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Revista Ambiente Contábil
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/27706
• topic: Tax aggressiveness, Regulatory agencies, BTD (Book-Tax Differences), ETRc (Current Effective Tax Rate), CashETR (Cash Effective Tax Rate)..; Tax aggressiveness in publicly traded companies operating in a regulated market.; Agresividad fiscal, Agencias regulatorias, BTD (Diferencias de impuestos contables), ETRc (tasa impositiva efectiva actual), CashETR (Tasa de impuestos efectiva en efectivo)..; Agresividad fiscal en empresas que cotizan en bolsa que operan en un mercado regulado; Agressividade tributária, Agências reguladoras, BTD (Book-Tax Differences). ETRc (Current Effective Tax Rate), CashETR (Cash Effective Tax Rate)..; Agressividade tributária nas empresas de capital aberto que atuam em mercado regulado

Purpose: The research aims to identify whether the regulated market through its agencies is a determining factor for a posture of less tax aggressiveness in companies. Methodology: BTD (Book-Tax Differences), ETRc (Current Effective Tax Rate) and CashETR (Cash Effective Tax Rate) were the indicators used in this study to measure the level of tax aggressiveness. The sample corresponded to all companies that traded their shares in B3, from 2010 to 2018. Results: The results of this study show that companies that operate in a regulated market are less tax aggressive than companies that operate in the free market. It was thus noted that market regulation acts as a factor that discourages the implementation of more aggressive tax strategies. Contributions of the Study: The practical contribution of this study was to evaluate the sectorial regulation model in force in the country, from the perspective of tax benefits and the control of tax aggressiveness. This study brings from theoretical contribution the need for a more effective participation of taxpayers for a regulatory model more guided by the mutual contribution between public administration and companies. Still under the theoretical aspect, the work contributes to the evaluation of sectorial regulation as a mechanism to control tax avoidance and reduce tax aggressiveness, in addition to providing initial study material for future research on the behavior of the regulated market in the face of tax aggressiveness.