Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2011 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Princípios (Natal. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/986 |
Resumo: | This paper is an effort to realize and explore the connections that exist between nonmonotonic logic and confirmation theory. We pick up one of the most wide-spread nonmonotonic formalisms – default logic – and analyze to what extent and under what adjustments it could work as a logic of induction in the philosophical sense. By making use of this analysis, we extend default logic so as to make it able to minimally perform the task of a logic of induction, having as a result a system which we believe has interesting properties from the standpoint of theory of confirmation. It is for instance able to represent chains of inductive rules as well as to reason paraconsistently on the conclusions obtained from them. We then use this logic to represent some traditional ideas concerning confirmation theory, in particular the ones proposed by Carl Hempel in his classical paper "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" of 1945 and the ones incorporated in the so-called abductive and hy-pothetico-deductive models. |
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Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic This paper is an effort to realize and explore the connections that exist between nonmonotonic logic and confirmation theory. We pick up one of the most wide-spread nonmonotonic formalisms – default logic – and analyze to what extent and under what adjustments it could work as a logic of induction in the philosophical sense. By making use of this analysis, we extend default logic so as to make it able to minimally perform the task of a logic of induction, having as a result a system which we believe has interesting properties from the standpoint of theory of confirmation. It is for instance able to represent chains of inductive rules as well as to reason paraconsistently on the conclusions obtained from them. We then use this logic to represent some traditional ideas concerning confirmation theory, in particular the ones proposed by Carl Hempel in his classical paper "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" of 1945 and the ones incorporated in the so-called abductive and hy-pothetico-deductive models. EDUFRN2011-05-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/986Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 17 n. 28 (2010): Princípios: revista de filosofia; 71-981983-21090104-8694reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/986/pdf_4Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilvestre, Ricardo Sousa2016-12-16T17:02:19Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/986Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2016-12-16T17:02:19Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic |
title |
Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic |
spellingShingle |
Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa |
title_short |
Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic |
title_full |
Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic |
title_fullStr |
Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic |
title_full_unstemmed |
Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic |
title_sort |
Induction and Confirmation Theory: An Approach based on a Paraconsistent Nonmonotonic Logic |
author |
Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa |
author_facet |
Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa |
description |
This paper is an effort to realize and explore the connections that exist between nonmonotonic logic and confirmation theory. We pick up one of the most wide-spread nonmonotonic formalisms – default logic – and analyze to what extent and under what adjustments it could work as a logic of induction in the philosophical sense. By making use of this analysis, we extend default logic so as to make it able to minimally perform the task of a logic of induction, having as a result a system which we believe has interesting properties from the standpoint of theory of confirmation. It is for instance able to represent chains of inductive rules as well as to reason paraconsistently on the conclusions obtained from them. We then use this logic to represent some traditional ideas concerning confirmation theory, in particular the ones proposed by Carl Hempel in his classical paper "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" of 1945 and the ones incorporated in the so-called abductive and hy-pothetico-deductive models. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2011-05-27 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/986 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/986 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/986/pdf_4 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
EDUFRN |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
EDUFRN |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 17 n. 28 (2010): Princípios: revista de filosofia; 71-98 1983-2109 0104-8694 reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) instacron:UFRN |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
instacron_str |
UFRN |
institution |
UFRN |
reponame_str |
Princípios (Natal. Online) |
collection |
Princípios (Natal. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||principios@cchla.ufrn.br |
_version_ |
1799769977846235136 |