How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Franco, Monica
Data de Publicação: 2023
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Princípios (Natal. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29152
Resumo: The article aims to answer how a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism. In order to offer the aimed answer, the semantic conclusions that these philosophers draw from the version of this thought experiment that applies to Peter Railton’s naturalist moral realism will be exposed. It will be proposed that even if a supporter of descriptivist moral cognitivism, such as Railton, accepts Horgan and Timmons’s objection, and abandons naturalist moral realism, he doesn’t need to adhere to the metaethical theory of Non-descriptivist cognitivism, and its anti-realist moral ontology. He has a way out by adhering to Derek Parfit’s Non-realist cognitivism, which, as will be argued, is possibly a superior metaethical theory to Non-descriptivist cognitivism.
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spelling How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivismComo um cognitivista moral pode aceitar o experimento de pensamento da Terra Gêmea Moral sem aceitar o Cognitivismo não-descritivista de Terence Horgan e Mark TimmonsMoral semanticsNaturalist moral realismMoral Twin EarthNon-realist cognitivismSemântica moralRealismo moral naturalistaTerra Gêmea MoralCognitivismo não-realistaThe article aims to answer how a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism. In order to offer the aimed answer, the semantic conclusions that these philosophers draw from the version of this thought experiment that applies to Peter Railton’s naturalist moral realism will be exposed. It will be proposed that even if a supporter of descriptivist moral cognitivism, such as Railton, accepts Horgan and Timmons’s objection, and abandons naturalist moral realism, he doesn’t need to adhere to the metaethical theory of Non-descriptivist cognitivism, and its anti-realist moral ontology. He has a way out by adhering to Derek Parfit’s Non-realist cognitivism, which, as will be argued, is possibly a superior metaethical theory to Non-descriptivist cognitivism.O artigo tem como objetivo responder como um cognitivista moral pode aceitar o experimento de pensamento da Terra Gêmea Moral sem aceitar o Cognitivismo não-descritivista de Terence Horgan e Mark Timmons. A fim de oferecer a resposta almejada, serão expostas as conclusões semânticas que esses filósofos extraem da versão desse experimento de pensamento que se aplica ao realismo moral naturalista de Peter Railton. Será proposto que mesmo que um defensor do cognitivismo moral descritivista, como Railton, aceite a objeção de Horgan e Timmons, e abandone o realismo moral naturalista, ele não precisa aderir à teoria metaética do Cognitivismo não-descritivista e à sua ontologia moral antirrealista. Ele tem como saída aderir ao Cognitivismo não-realista de Derek Parfit, que, conforme será argumentado, possivelmente é uma teoria metaética superior ao Cognitivismo não-descritivista.EDUFRN2023-11-20info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/2915210.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n62ID29152Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 30 n. 63 (2023): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)1983-21090104-869410.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n63reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29152/17222https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29152/17751Copyright (c) 2023 Monica Francohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFranco, Monica2023-11-20T12:23:50Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/29152Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2023-11-20T12:23:50Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism
Como um cognitivista moral pode aceitar o experimento de pensamento da Terra Gêmea Moral sem aceitar o Cognitivismo não-descritivista de Terence Horgan e Mark Timmons
title How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism
spellingShingle How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism
Franco, Monica
Moral semantics
Naturalist moral realism
Moral Twin Earth
Non-realist cognitivism
Semântica moral
Realismo moral naturalista
Terra Gêmea Moral
Cognitivismo não-realista
title_short How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism
title_full How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism
title_fullStr How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism
title_full_unstemmed How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism
title_sort How a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism
author Franco, Monica
author_facet Franco, Monica
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Franco, Monica
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Moral semantics
Naturalist moral realism
Moral Twin Earth
Non-realist cognitivism
Semântica moral
Realismo moral naturalista
Terra Gêmea Moral
Cognitivismo não-realista
topic Moral semantics
Naturalist moral realism
Moral Twin Earth
Non-realist cognitivism
Semântica moral
Realismo moral naturalista
Terra Gêmea Moral
Cognitivismo não-realista
description The article aims to answer how a moral cognitivist can accept the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment without accepting Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Non-descriptivist cognitivism. In order to offer the aimed answer, the semantic conclusions that these philosophers draw from the version of this thought experiment that applies to Peter Railton’s naturalist moral realism will be exposed. It will be proposed that even if a supporter of descriptivist moral cognitivism, such as Railton, accepts Horgan and Timmons’s objection, and abandons naturalist moral realism, he doesn’t need to adhere to the metaethical theory of Non-descriptivist cognitivism, and its anti-realist moral ontology. He has a way out by adhering to Derek Parfit’s Non-realist cognitivism, which, as will be argued, is possibly a superior metaethical theory to Non-descriptivist cognitivism.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-11-20
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29152
10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n62ID29152
url https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29152
identifier_str_mv 10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n62ID29152
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29152/17222
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29152/17751
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Monica Franco
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Monica Franco
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 30 n. 63 (2023): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)
1983-2109
0104-8694
10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n63
reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron:UFRN
instname_str Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron_str UFRN
institution UFRN
reponame_str Princípios (Natal. Online)
collection Princípios (Natal. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||principios@cchla.ufrn.br
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