A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Costa, Claudio Ferreira
Data de Publicação: 2010
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Princípios (Natal. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/695
Resumo: In this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, such as those of the Gettier type.
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spelling A Definição Tradicional de ConhecimentoIn this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, such as those of the Gettier type. EDUFRN2010-10-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/695Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 4 n. 05 (1997): Princípios: revista de filosofia; 63-1021983-21090104-8694reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/695/638Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCosta, Claudio Ferreira2016-12-16T16:48:03Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/695Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2016-12-16T16:48:03Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento
title A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento
spellingShingle A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento
Costa, Claudio Ferreira
title_short A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento
title_full A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento
title_fullStr A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento
title_full_unstemmed A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento
title_sort A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento
author Costa, Claudio Ferreira
author_facet Costa, Claudio Ferreira
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Costa, Claudio Ferreira
description In this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, such as those of the Gettier type.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-10-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/695
url https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/695
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/695/638
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 4 n. 05 (1997): Princípios: revista de filosofia; 63-102
1983-2109
0104-8694
reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron:UFRN
instname_str Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron_str UFRN
institution UFRN
reponame_str Princípios (Natal. Online)
collection Princípios (Natal. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||principios@cchla.ufrn.br
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