On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Erickson, Evelyn Fernandes
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80109
Resumo: A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.
id UFSC-5_0d6e3e26a576c0b89987c2eceeb37ac4
oai_identifier_str oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/80109
network_acronym_str UFSC-5
network_name_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository_id_str
spelling On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalismOn the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalismOn the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalismA recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2021-07-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8010910.5007/1808-1711.2021.e80109Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2021); 59–71Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 25 Núm. 1 (2021); 59–71Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 25 n. 1 (2021); 59–711808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80109/46899Copyright (c) 2021 Evelyn Fernandes Ericksonhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessErickson, Evelyn Fernandes2021-09-17T17:24:36Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/80109Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2021-09-17T17:24:36Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
title On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
spellingShingle On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
Erickson, Evelyn Fernandes
title_short On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
title_full On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
title_fullStr On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
title_full_unstemmed On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
title_sort On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism
author Erickson, Evelyn Fernandes
author_facet Erickson, Evelyn Fernandes
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Erickson, Evelyn Fernandes
description A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-07-08
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80109
10.5007/1808-1711.2021.e80109
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80109
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.e80109
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80109/46899
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Evelyn Fernandes Erickson
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Evelyn Fernandes Erickson
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2021); 59–71
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 25 Núm. 1 (2021); 59–71
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 25 n. 1 (2021); 59–71
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
_version_ 1789435108878450688

Registros relacionados