Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Duran, Juan Manuel
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: spa
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125
Resumo: In this article I propose an analysis of two opposing viewpoints on the notion of computer simulation. The first one, proposed by Stephan Hartmann, has been adopted by philosophers who believe that computer simulations can be understood by means of a familiar philosophy, such as a philosophy of scientific models or a philosophy of scientific experimentation. The second notion belongs to Paul Humphreys, who suggests that computer simulations are objects of genuine philosophical interest, and that understanding their nature allows us to understand their role in current scientific practice.
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spelling Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones AntagònicasSimulaciones computacionales: hacia un análisis de dos concepciones antagónicasSimulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones AntagònicasIn this article I propose an analysis of two opposing viewpoints on the notion of computer simulation. The first one, proposed by Stephan Hartmann, has been adopted by philosophers who believe that computer simulations can be understood by means of a familiar philosophy, such as a philosophy of scientific models or a philosophy of scientific experimentation. The second notion belongs to Paul Humphreys, who suggests that computer simulations are objects of genuine philosophical interest, and that understanding their nature allows us to understand their role in current scientific practice.En este trabajo propongo un análisis de dos posiciones antagónicas sobre la noción de simulación computacional. La primera, proveniente de Stephan Hartmann, ha sido bienvenida por filósofos que entienden que las simulaciones computacionales pueden ser entendidas desde la perspectiva de una filosofía familiar, ya sea desde la filosofía de los modelos científicos como la filosofía de la experimentación. La segunda posición, perteneciente a Paul Humphreys, entiende que las simulacio- nes son objetos de inter ́es filos ́ofico genuino en sí mismo, y que entender su naturaleza permite comprender su rol en la práctica científica actual. Mi análisis se extiende a elaborar en críicas a ambas partes. In this article I propose an analysis of two opposing viewpoints on the notionof computer simulation. The first one, proposed by Stephan Hartmann, has been adopted by philosophers who believe that computer simulations can be understood by means of a familiar philosophy, such as a philosophy of scientific models or a philosophy of scientific experimentation. The second notion belongs to Paul Humphreys, who suggests that computer simulations are objects of genuine philosophical interest, and that understanding their nature allows us to understand their role in current scientific practice.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2017-11-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p12510.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 No. 1 (2017); 125-140Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 Núm. 1 (2017); 125-140Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 21 n. 1 (2017); 125-1401808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125/35807Copyright (c) 2021 Juan Manuel Duraninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDuran, Juan Manuel2018-02-11T11:46:26Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/40456Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2018-02-11T11:46:26Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
Simulaciones computacionales: hacia un análisis de dos concepciones antagónicas
Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
title Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
spellingShingle Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
Duran, Juan Manuel
title_short Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
title_full Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
title_fullStr Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
title_full_unstemmed Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
title_sort Simulaciones Computacionales: Un Análisis de dos Concepciones Antagònicas
author Duran, Juan Manuel
author_facet Duran, Juan Manuel
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Duran, Juan Manuel
description In this article I propose an analysis of two opposing viewpoints on the notion of computer simulation. The first one, proposed by Stephan Hartmann, has been adopted by philosophers who believe that computer simulations can be understood by means of a familiar philosophy, such as a philosophy of scientific models or a philosophy of scientific experimentation. The second notion belongs to Paul Humphreys, who suggests that computer simulations are objects of genuine philosophical interest, and that understanding their nature allows us to understand their role in current scientific practice.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-11-16
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125
10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p125/35807
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Juan Manuel Duran
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Juan Manuel Duran
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 No. 1 (2017); 125-140
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 Núm. 1 (2017); 125-140
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 21 n. 1 (2017); 125-140
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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