Mind, Davidson and reality
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2005 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14609 |
Resumo: | The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irrealism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general haracterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show thatmost candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of intentional realism which is not, is a restricted one which is prima facie no more plausible than the corresponding form of irrealism. In the third and last section, I defend my interpretation of what intentional irrealism amounts to against some possible misunderstandings, give some reasons why it should be taken seriously and argue that it could plausibly be attributed to Davidson. |
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Mind, Davidson and realityMind, Davidson and RealityThe aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irrealism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general haracterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show thatmost candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of intentional realism which is not, is a restricted one which is prima facie no more plausible than the corresponding form of irrealism. In the third and last section, I defend my interpretation of what intentional irrealism amounts to against some possible misunderstandings, give some reasons why it should be taken seriously and argue that it could plausibly be attributed to Davidson.O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que as perspectivas para o irrealismo intencional são muito melhores do que geralmente se pensa. Na primeira seção, pergunto se há alguma forma de realismo acerca de estados intencionais que seja defensável. Mostro que a maioria dos candidatos são praticamente trivialmente falsos, e que a única forma de realismo intencional que não é falsa é uma forma restrita que, à primeira vista, não é mais plausível que a forma correspondente de irrealismo. Na segunda seção, defendo minha interpretação do que significa o irrealismo intencional contra alguns possíveis mal-entendidos, apresento algumas razões por que deveria ser tomado seriamente, e argumento que poderia ser plausivelmente atribuído a Davidson.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2005-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1460910.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 125-157Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 125-157Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 125-1571808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14609/13357Copyright (c) 2021 Daniel Laurierhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLaurier, Daniel2016-01-02T12:15:36Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14609Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:15:36Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Mind, Davidson and reality Mind, Davidson and Reality |
title |
Mind, Davidson and reality |
spellingShingle |
Mind, Davidson and reality Laurier, Daniel |
title_short |
Mind, Davidson and reality |
title_full |
Mind, Davidson and reality |
title_fullStr |
Mind, Davidson and reality |
title_full_unstemmed |
Mind, Davidson and reality |
title_sort |
Mind, Davidson and reality |
author |
Laurier, Daniel |
author_facet |
Laurier, Daniel |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Laurier, Daniel |
description |
The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irrealism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general haracterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show thatmost candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of intentional realism which is not, is a restricted one which is prima facie no more plausible than the corresponding form of irrealism. In the third and last section, I defend my interpretation of what intentional irrealism amounts to against some possible misunderstandings, give some reasons why it should be taken seriously and argue that it could plausibly be attributed to Davidson. |
publishDate |
2005 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2005-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14609 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14609 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14609/13357 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Daniel Laurier http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Daniel Laurier http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 125-157 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 125-157 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 125-157 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435108926685184 |