Impossibilia
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81 |
Resumo: | The paper defends the so-called extended modal realism, a theory according to which there are concrete impossible worlds. Firstly, modal realism is presented. Next, the way of how its ontology enriched by impossible worlds should look like in order to save its main theoretical virtues is pursued. Finally, I argue for a claim that metaphysical impossibility equals to dissimilarity between worlds instantiating distinct metaphysical structures. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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|
spelling |
ImpossibiliaThe paper defends the so-called extended modal realism, a theory according to which there are concrete impossible worlds. Firstly, modal realism is presented. Next, the way of how its ontology enriched by impossible worlds should look like in order to save its main theoretical virtues is pursued. Finally, I argue for a claim that metaphysical impossibility equals to dissimilarity between worlds instantiating distinct metaphysical structures.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2016-09-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2016v20n1p8110.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 No. 1 (2016); 81-97Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 Núm. 1 (2016); 81-97Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 20 n. 1 (2016); 81-971808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81/32595Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Vacekinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVacek, Martin2019-09-13T10:46:30Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/46829Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T10:46:30Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Impossibilia |
title |
Impossibilia |
spellingShingle |
Impossibilia Vacek, Martin |
title_short |
Impossibilia |
title_full |
Impossibilia |
title_fullStr |
Impossibilia |
title_full_unstemmed |
Impossibilia |
title_sort |
Impossibilia |
author |
Vacek, Martin |
author_facet |
Vacek, Martin |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vacek, Martin |
description |
The paper defends the so-called extended modal realism, a theory according to which there are concrete impossible worlds. Firstly, modal realism is presented. Next, the way of how its ontology enriched by impossible worlds should look like in order to save its main theoretical virtues is pursued. Finally, I argue for a claim that metaphysical impossibility equals to dissimilarity between worlds instantiating distinct metaphysical structures. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-09-22 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81 10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81/32595 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Vacek info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Vacek |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 No. 1 (2016); 81-97 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 Núm. 1 (2016); 81-97 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 20 n. 1 (2016); 81-97 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435112625012736 |