Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2000 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056 |
Resumo: | It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certai contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challengeIt has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certai contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2000-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1905610.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2000); 187-214Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 4 Núm. 2 (2000); 187-214Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 4 n. 2 (2000); 187-2141808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056/17554Copyright (c) 2021 Duncan Pritchardhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPritchard, Duncan2016-01-02T12:18:34Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/19056Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:18:34Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge |
title |
Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge |
spellingShingle |
Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge Pritchard, Duncan |
title_short |
Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge |
title_full |
Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge |
title_fullStr |
Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge |
title_full_unstemmed |
Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge |
title_sort |
Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge |
author |
Pritchard, Duncan |
author_facet |
Pritchard, Duncan |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pritchard, Duncan |
description |
It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certai contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge. |
publishDate |
2000 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2000-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056/17554 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Duncan Pritchard http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Duncan Pritchard http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2000); 187-214 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 4 Núm. 2 (2000); 187-214 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 4 n. 2 (2000); 187-214 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435111295418368 |