Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pritchard, Duncan
Data de Publicação: 2000
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056
Resumo: It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certai contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge.
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spelling Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challengeIt has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certai contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2000-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1905610.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2000); 187-214Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 4 Núm. 2 (2000); 187-214Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 4 n. 2 (2000); 187-2141808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056/17554Copyright (c) 2021 Duncan Pritchardhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPritchard, Duncan2016-01-02T12:18:34Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/19056Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:18:34Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
title Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
spellingShingle Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
Pritchard, Duncan
title_short Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
title_full Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
title_fullStr Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
title_full_unstemmed Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
title_sort Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
author Pritchard, Duncan
author_facet Pritchard, Duncan
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pritchard, Duncan
description It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certai contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge.
publishDate 2000
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2000-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056
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url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056/17554
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Duncan Pritchard
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Duncan Pritchard
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2000); 187-214
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 4 Núm. 2 (2000); 187-214
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 4 n. 2 (2000); 187-214
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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