Quine's ideological debacle
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2004 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14688 |
Resumo: | In two papers in the mid-seventies, Quine has discussed an ontological debacle, the reduction of ontology to an ontology of pure sets only. This debacle, which weakened Quine’s interest in ontology, is the natural outcome of ontological relativity, or, more precisely, the proxy-function argument. It is explainedhow Quine unavoidably came to this conclusion. Moreover, it is argued that the result is even more damaging for Quine’s philosophy than has hitherto been assumed. It is shown that in addition to an ontological debacle, there is an ideological debacle, reducing the ideology (lexicon) of science tothe ideology of set theory. The ideological debacle results from applying extensional substitution of predicates within a scientific theory that is reinterpreted by means of proxy-functions to a theory with a set-theoretic ontology. Though Quine has recognized the possibility of an ideological debacle, his rebuttal is unconvincing. As a result, his tenet of extensionalism is under heavy pressure. |
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Quine's ideological debacleQuine's Ideological DebacleIn two papers in the mid-seventies, Quine has discussed an ontological debacle, the reduction of ontology to an ontology of pure sets only. This debacle, which weakened Quine’s interest in ontology, is the natural outcome of ontological relativity, or, more precisely, the proxy-function argument. It is explainedhow Quine unavoidably came to this conclusion. Moreover, it is argued that the result is even more damaging for Quine’s philosophy than has hitherto been assumed. It is shown that in addition to an ontological debacle, there is an ideological debacle, reducing the ideology (lexicon) of science tothe ideology of set theory. The ideological debacle results from applying extensional substitution of predicates within a scientific theory that is reinterpreted by means of proxy-functions to a theory with a set-theoretic ontology. Though Quine has recognized the possibility of an ideological debacle, his rebuttal is unconvincing. As a result, his tenet of extensionalism is under heavy pressure.Em dois artigos em meados dos anos 70s, Quine discutiu um desastre onto-lógico, a redução da ontologia a uma pura ontologia de conjuntos. Esse de-sastre, que enfraqueceu o interesse de Quine pela ontologia, é o resultado natural da relatividade ontológica, ou, mais precisamente, do argumento das funções vicárias. Explica-se por que Quine chegou a essa conclusão inevitável. Além disso, argumenta-se que o resultado é ainda mais danoso para a filosofia de Quine do que se presumiu até aqui. Mostra-se que, além do de-sastre ontológico, há um desastre ideológico, reduzindo a ideologia (léxico) da ciência a uma ideologia de teoria de conjuntos. O desastre ideológico re-sulta da aplicação de substituições extensionais de predicados dentro de uma teoria científica, que é reinterpretada por meio de funções vicárias como uma teoria com uma ontologia da teoria de conjuntos. Embora Quine tenha reconhecido a possibilidade de tal desastre ideológico, sua resposta não é convincente. Como resultado disso, sua tese extensionalista fica sob forte pressão.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2004-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1468810.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 No. 1 (2004); 85-102Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 Núm. 1 (2004); 85-102Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 8 n. 1 (2004); 85-1021808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14688/13458Copyright (c) 2021 Lieven Decockhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDecock, Lieven2016-01-02T12:16:29Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14688Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:16:29Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Quine's ideological debacle Quine's Ideological Debacle |
title |
Quine's ideological debacle |
spellingShingle |
Quine's ideological debacle Decock, Lieven |
title_short |
Quine's ideological debacle |
title_full |
Quine's ideological debacle |
title_fullStr |
Quine's ideological debacle |
title_full_unstemmed |
Quine's ideological debacle |
title_sort |
Quine's ideological debacle |
author |
Decock, Lieven |
author_facet |
Decock, Lieven |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Decock, Lieven |
description |
In two papers in the mid-seventies, Quine has discussed an ontological debacle, the reduction of ontology to an ontology of pure sets only. This debacle, which weakened Quine’s interest in ontology, is the natural outcome of ontological relativity, or, more precisely, the proxy-function argument. It is explainedhow Quine unavoidably came to this conclusion. Moreover, it is argued that the result is even more damaging for Quine’s philosophy than has hitherto been assumed. It is shown that in addition to an ontological debacle, there is an ideological debacle, reducing the ideology (lexicon) of science tothe ideology of set theory. The ideological debacle results from applying extensional substitution of predicates within a scientific theory that is reinterpreted by means of proxy-functions to a theory with a set-theoretic ontology. Though Quine has recognized the possibility of an ideological debacle, his rebuttal is unconvincing. As a result, his tenet of extensionalism is under heavy pressure. |
publishDate |
2004 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2004-01-01 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14688 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14688 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14688/13458 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Lieven Decock http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Lieven Decock http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 No. 1 (2004); 85-102 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 Núm. 1 (2004); 85-102 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 8 n. 1 (2004); 85-102 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
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UFSC |
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UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435110150373376 |