Analyticity and Translation
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2003 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796 |
Resumo: | Quine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This is because the class of ana-lytic statements that his account of meaning enables us to isolate is of no phi-losophical interest, and because we can hold that translation is determined without admitting that meaning is. |
id |
UFSC-5_4d7c8a472b50f9a1dadd06220ea2f652 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14796 |
network_acronym_str |
UFSC-5 |
network_name_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Analyticity and TranslationQuine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This is because the class of ana-lytic statements that his account of meaning enables us to isolate is of no phi-losophical interest, and because we can hold that translation is determined without admitting that meaning is.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2003-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1479610.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 147-170Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 147-170Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 147-1701808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796/13508Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Montminyhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMontminy, Martin2016-01-02T12:16:55Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14796Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:16:55Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Analyticity and Translation |
title |
Analyticity and Translation |
spellingShingle |
Analyticity and Translation Montminy, Martin |
title_short |
Analyticity and Translation |
title_full |
Analyticity and Translation |
title_fullStr |
Analyticity and Translation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Analyticity and Translation |
title_sort |
Analyticity and Translation |
author |
Montminy, Martin |
author_facet |
Montminy, Martin |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Montminy, Martin |
description |
Quine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This is because the class of ana-lytic statements that his account of meaning enables us to isolate is of no phi-losophical interest, and because we can hold that translation is determined without admitting that meaning is. |
publishDate |
2003 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2003-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796/13508 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Montminy http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Montminy http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 147-170 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 147-170 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 147-170 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435110244745216 |