Analyticity and Translation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Montminy, Martin
Data de Publicação: 2003
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796
Resumo: Quine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This is because the class of ana-lytic statements that his account of meaning enables us to isolate is of no phi-losophical interest, and because we can hold that translation is determined without admitting that meaning is.
id UFSC-5_4d7c8a472b50f9a1dadd06220ea2f652
oai_identifier_str oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14796
network_acronym_str UFSC-5
network_name_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Analyticity and TranslationQuine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This is because the class of ana-lytic statements that his account of meaning enables us to isolate is of no phi-losophical interest, and because we can hold that translation is determined without admitting that meaning is.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2003-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1479610.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 147-170Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 147-170Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 147-1701808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796/13508Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Montminyhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMontminy, Martin2016-01-02T12:16:55Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14796Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:16:55Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Analyticity and Translation
title Analyticity and Translation
spellingShingle Analyticity and Translation
Montminy, Martin
title_short Analyticity and Translation
title_full Analyticity and Translation
title_fullStr Analyticity and Translation
title_full_unstemmed Analyticity and Translation
title_sort Analyticity and Translation
author Montminy, Martin
author_facet Montminy, Martin
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Montminy, Martin
description Quine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This is because the class of ana-lytic statements that his account of meaning enables us to isolate is of no phi-losophical interest, and because we can hold that translation is determined without admitting that meaning is.
publishDate 2003
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2003-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796
10.5007/%x
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14796/13508
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Montminy
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Montminy
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 147-170
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 147-170
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 147-170
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
_version_ 1789435110244745216