Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/81299 |
Resumo: | My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske's celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process rather than an event that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30 pm CST on November 23 in 1963 in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. E.g. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. |
id |
UFSC-5_7ef2ca7ee076920ac2e420f75074dfea |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/81299 |
network_acronym_str |
UFSC-5 |
network_name_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Causal Role of Phenomenal ConsciousnessCausal Role of Phenomenal Consciousnessphenomenal causationstructuring causestriggering causesstructuring behaviorMy account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske's celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process rather than an event that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30 pm CST on November 23 in 1963 in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. E.g. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand.. My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske's celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process rather than an event that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30 pm CST on November 23 in 1963 in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. E.g. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2022-08-19info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8129910.5007/1808-1711.2022.e81299Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2022); 299–312Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2022); 299–312Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 26 n. 2 (2022); 299–3121808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/81299/51423Copyright (c) 2022 Roberto Horácio Sá Pereirahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPereira, Roberto Horácio Sá2023-09-01T16:22:30Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/81299Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-09-01T16:22:30Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness |
title |
Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness |
spellingShingle |
Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness Pereira, Roberto Horácio Sá phenomenal causation structuring causes triggering causes structuring behavior |
title_short |
Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness |
title_full |
Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness |
title_fullStr |
Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness |
title_full_unstemmed |
Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness |
title_sort |
Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness |
author |
Pereira, Roberto Horácio Sá |
author_facet |
Pereira, Roberto Horácio Sá |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pereira, Roberto Horácio Sá |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
phenomenal causation structuring causes triggering causes structuring behavior |
topic |
phenomenal causation structuring causes triggering causes structuring behavior |
description |
My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske's celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process rather than an event that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30 pm CST on November 23 in 1963 in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. E.g. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-08-19 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/81299 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e81299 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/81299 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e81299 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/81299/51423 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2022); 299–312 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2022); 299–312 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 26 n. 2 (2022); 299–312 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1799875201182203904 |