Collapse, Plurals and Sets

• Autor(a) principal: Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro
• Data de Publicação: 2014
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
• DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n3p419
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n3p419

This paper raises the question under what circumstances a plurality forms a set. My main point is that not always all things form sets. A provocative way of presenting my position is that, as a result of my approach, there are more pluralities than sets. Another way of presenting the same thesis claims that there are ways of talking about objects that do not always collapse into sets. My argument is related to expressive powers of formal languages. Assuming classical logic, I show that if all plurality form a set and the quantifiers are absolutely general, then one gets a trivial theory. So, by reductio, one has to abandon one of the premiss. Then, I argue against the collapse of the pluralities into sets. What I am advocating is that the thesis of collapse limits important applications of the plural logic in model theory, when it is assumed that the quantifiers are absolutely general.