Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2011 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415 |
Resumo: | The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort of know-how in opposition to the acquisition of an information (know-that). The paper presents and examines critically some recent attempts to compatibilize the sui generis nature of phenomenal knowledge with the materialist claim that the content of this sort of knowledge is constituted entirely by physical facts. |
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Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismoExperiências, Conhecimento Fenomenal e MaterialismoThe claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort of know-how in opposition to the acquisition of an information (know-that). The paper presents and examines critically some recent attempts to compatibilize the sui generis nature of phenomenal knowledge with the materialist claim that the content of this sort of knowledge is constituted entirely by physical facts. A ideia intuitivamente plausível de que pelo menos alguns de nossos estados mentais teriam aspectos fenomenais qualitativos aos quais nós teríamos um acesso cognitivo privilegiado é considerada por muitos filósofos como incompatível com a ontologia fisicista. Alguns defensores radicais do fisicismo preferem simplesmente negar a existência de aspectos qualitativos, ao passo que outros materialistas procuram reinterpretar a cognição do caráter fenomenal da nossa experiência do mundo como a aquisição de uma habilidade, isto é, como uma forma de know-how, em oposição à aquisição de informação (know-that). O presente trabalho expõe e examina criticamente algumas tentativas recentes de compatibilização da natureza sui generis da apreensão cognitiva do caráter fenomenal da nossa experiência com a tese materialista de que o conteúdo proposicional dessa cognição é constituído exclusivamente por fatos físicos. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2011-09-19info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p41510.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 No. 3 (2011); 415-438Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 Núm. 3 (2011); 415-438Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 15 n. 3 (2011); 415-4381808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415/22387Copyright (c) 2021 Wilson Mendonça, Julia Telles Menezesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMendonça, WilsonMenezes, Julia Telles2019-09-12T11:35:26Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/22041Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T11:35:26Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo Experiências, Conhecimento Fenomenal e Materialismo |
title |
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo |
spellingShingle |
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo Mendonça, Wilson |
title_short |
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo |
title_full |
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo |
title_fullStr |
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo |
title_full_unstemmed |
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo |
title_sort |
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo |
author |
Mendonça, Wilson |
author_facet |
Mendonça, Wilson Menezes, Julia Telles |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Menezes, Julia Telles |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mendonça, Wilson Menezes, Julia Telles |
description |
The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort of know-how in opposition to the acquisition of an information (know-that). The paper presents and examines critically some recent attempts to compatibilize the sui generis nature of phenomenal knowledge with the materialist claim that the content of this sort of knowledge is constituted entirely by physical facts. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2011-09-19 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415/22387 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Wilson Mendonça, Julia Telles Menezes info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Wilson Mendonça, Julia Telles Menezes |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 No. 3 (2011); 415-438 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 Núm. 3 (2011); 415-438 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 15 n. 3 (2011); 415-438 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435111387693056 |