Intuition and Russell´s Paradox

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Cuonzo, Margaret
Data de Publicação: 2001
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17763
Resumo: In this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell's parado; showing how different appraaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have episternic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case of Russell's paradox, this is an ambiguity in the notion of a class.
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spelling Intuition and Russell´s ParadoxIn this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell's parado; showing how different appraaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have episternic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case of Russell's paradox, this is an ambiguity in the notion of a class.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2001-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1776310.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 5 No. 1-2 (2001); 73-86Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 5 Núm. 1-2 (2001); 73-86Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 5 n. 1-2 (2001); 73-861808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17763/16348Copyright (c) 2021 Margaret Cuonzohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCuonzo, Margaret2016-01-02T12:18:13Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/17763Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:18:13Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Intuition and Russell´s Paradox
title Intuition and Russell´s Paradox
spellingShingle Intuition and Russell´s Paradox
Cuonzo, Margaret
title_short Intuition and Russell´s Paradox
title_full Intuition and Russell´s Paradox
title_fullStr Intuition and Russell´s Paradox
title_full_unstemmed Intuition and Russell´s Paradox
title_sort Intuition and Russell´s Paradox
author Cuonzo, Margaret
author_facet Cuonzo, Margaret
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Cuonzo, Margaret
description In this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell's parado; showing how different appraaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have episternic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case of Russell's paradox, this is an ambiguity in the notion of a class.
publishDate 2001
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2001-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17763
10.5007/%x
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17763
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17763/16348
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Margaret Cuonzo
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Margaret Cuonzo
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 5 No. 1-2 (2001); 73-86
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 5 Núm. 1-2 (2001); 73-86
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 5 n. 1-2 (2001); 73-86
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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