Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/84745 |
Resumo: | In this paper I discuss the nature and structure of analysis of propositional ignorance. First, I will argue that unlike as at least two of the main conceptions of the epistemology of ignorance have assumed, the analysis of propositional ignorance is not reduced to the structure “S is ignorant that P” or similar variants of this structure. In reading propositional ignorance reduced in terms of "S is ignorant that P," these views do not make a good analysis of propositional ignorance. This is because, on the one hand, they generate a problem that refers to a possibility that has been little worked on. It is about the possibility of ignorance about false propositions and the problem, as will be shown, is that in this reduction there are good reasons both to affirm and to deny this possibility. This constitutes, at least, as a relevant theoretical tension that can compromise these conceptions and the analyzes carried out based on them. On the other hand, this reduction excludes at least a general and not necessarily factual sense of propositional ignorance, which deprives us of a more adequate analysis of ignorance and other related issues. Having this problem and its consequences in view, I will argue, secondly, for a hypothesis that has the potential to dissolve it by reformulating how we understand propositional ignorance, inheriting the advantages of reasons in favor and of reasons against the possibility of ignorance about false propositions and overcoming the objections raised against them. |
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Propositional Ignorance and False PropositionsIgnorância Proposicional e Proposições FalsasEpistemologypropositional ignorancestandard viewnew viewfalse propositionsreformulationIn this paper I discuss the nature and structure of analysis of propositional ignorance. First, I will argue that unlike as at least two of the main conceptions of the epistemology of ignorance have assumed, the analysis of propositional ignorance is not reduced to the structure “S is ignorant that P” or similar variants of this structure. In reading propositional ignorance reduced in terms of "S is ignorant that P," these views do not make a good analysis of propositional ignorance. This is because, on the one hand, they generate a problem that refers to a possibility that has been little worked on. It is about the possibility of ignorance about false propositions and the problem, as will be shown, is that in this reduction there are good reasons both to affirm and to deny this possibility. This constitutes, at least, as a relevant theoretical tension that can compromise these conceptions and the analyzes carried out based on them. On the other hand, this reduction excludes at least a general and not necessarily factual sense of propositional ignorance, which deprives us of a more adequate analysis of ignorance and other related issues. Having this problem and its consequences in view, I will argue, secondly, for a hypothesis that has the potential to dissolve it by reformulating how we understand propositional ignorance, inheriting the advantages of reasons in favor and of reasons against the possibility of ignorance about false propositions and overcoming the objections raised against them. Neste trabalho discuto a natureza e a estrutura de análise da ignorância proposicional. Meu objetivo é de apontar que, em primeiro lugar, diferentemente de como ao menos duas das principais concepções da epistemologia da ignorância têm pressuposto, a análise da ignorância proposicional não se reduz a estrutura “S é ignorante que P” ou variantes semelhantes a esta estrutura. Ao lerem a ignorância proposicional reduzida em termos de “S é ignorante que P”, essas concepções não fazem a melhor análise da ignorância proposicional. Isto porque, por um lado, geram um problema que se refere a uma possibilidade pouco trabalhada. Trata-se da possibilidade da ignorância sobre proposições falsas e o problema, como será mostrado, é que nessa redução há boas razões tanto para afirmar como para negar essa possibilidade. Isso se constitui, no mínimo, como uma tensão teórica relevante que pode comprometer essas concepções e as análises realizadas a partir delas. Por outro lado, essa redução exclui ao menos um sentido geral e não necessariamente factivo de ignorância proposicional, o que nos priva de uma análise mais adequada da ignorância e de outros temas relacionados. Tendo esse problema e os seus desdobramentos em vista, apontarei, em segundo lugar, para uma hipótese que tem o potencial de dissolvê-lo a partir da reformulação de como compreendemos a ignorância proposicional, herdando as vantagens das razões a favor e das razões contra a possibilidade da ignorância sobre proposições falsas e superando as objeções levantadas contra elas. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2022-06-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8474510.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84745Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 No. 1 (2022): Special Issue: Models and Modeling in the Sciences; 113-133Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 Núm. 1 (2022): Special Issue: Models and Modeling in the Sciences; 113-133Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 26 n. 1 (2022): Special Issue: Models and Modeling in the Sciences; 113-1331808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/84745/51096Copyright (c) 2022 Lucas Jairo Cervantes Bispohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBispo, Lucas Jairo Cervantes2022-06-07T23:51:27Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/84745Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2022-06-07T23:51:27Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions Ignorância Proposicional e Proposições Falsas |
title |
Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions |
spellingShingle |
Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions Bispo, Lucas Jairo Cervantes Epistemology propositional ignorance standard view new view false propositions reformulation |
title_short |
Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions |
title_full |
Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions |
title_fullStr |
Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions |
title_full_unstemmed |
Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions |
title_sort |
Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions |
author |
Bispo, Lucas Jairo Cervantes |
author_facet |
Bispo, Lucas Jairo Cervantes |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bispo, Lucas Jairo Cervantes |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Epistemology propositional ignorance standard view new view false propositions reformulation |
topic |
Epistemology propositional ignorance standard view new view false propositions reformulation |
description |
In this paper I discuss the nature and structure of analysis of propositional ignorance. First, I will argue that unlike as at least two of the main conceptions of the epistemology of ignorance have assumed, the analysis of propositional ignorance is not reduced to the structure “S is ignorant that P” or similar variants of this structure. In reading propositional ignorance reduced in terms of "S is ignorant that P," these views do not make a good analysis of propositional ignorance. This is because, on the one hand, they generate a problem that refers to a possibility that has been little worked on. It is about the possibility of ignorance about false propositions and the problem, as will be shown, is that in this reduction there are good reasons both to affirm and to deny this possibility. This constitutes, at least, as a relevant theoretical tension that can compromise these conceptions and the analyzes carried out based on them. On the other hand, this reduction excludes at least a general and not necessarily factual sense of propositional ignorance, which deprives us of a more adequate analysis of ignorance and other related issues. Having this problem and its consequences in view, I will argue, secondly, for a hypothesis that has the potential to dissolve it by reformulating how we understand propositional ignorance, inheriting the advantages of reasons in favor and of reasons against the possibility of ignorance about false propositions and overcoming the objections raised against them. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-06-07 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/84745 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84745 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/84745 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84745 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/84745/51096 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Lucas Jairo Cervantes Bispo http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Lucas Jairo Cervantes Bispo http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 No. 1 (2022): Special Issue: Models and Modeling in the Sciences; 113-133 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 Núm. 1 (2022): Special Issue: Models and Modeling in the Sciences; 113-133 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 26 n. 1 (2022): Special Issue: Models and Modeling in the Sciences; 113-133 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435114038493184 |