Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2003 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14840 |
Resumo: | One of the main contributions of philosophers at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century to philosophy of science and semantics was the thesis inspired in the scientific advances of natural and exact sciences, that there is not a single true theory of what goes on in the empirical world, but rather the possibility of constructing multiple versions, equally satisfac-tory, of an explanation of the world. In the Vienna Circle, more specifically, the conventionalist movement showed its influence primarily in the writings of Neurath, but also, more subtly, in the texts of Carnap. In this paper, I shall examine the theoretical relations between Quine’s holistic thesis and the conventionalist aspects of his work. In order to do this I will discuss Neurath’s holistic coherentism and of the conventionalist and holistic aspects present in Camap’s work, which merge, mainly in the Aufbau, with reduc-tionist aims. Thus, I intend to help to clarify to what extent Quine’s holism depends on a conventionalist position and to what extent conventionalism, in its turn, can get along with reductionist epistemological remains. |
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Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard QuineOne of the main contributions of philosophers at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century to philosophy of science and semantics was the thesis inspired in the scientific advances of natural and exact sciences, that there is not a single true theory of what goes on in the empirical world, but rather the possibility of constructing multiple versions, equally satisfac-tory, of an explanation of the world. In the Vienna Circle, more specifically, the conventionalist movement showed its influence primarily in the writings of Neurath, but also, more subtly, in the texts of Carnap. In this paper, I shall examine the theoretical relations between Quine’s holistic thesis and the conventionalist aspects of his work. In order to do this I will discuss Neurath’s holistic coherentism and of the conventionalist and holistic aspects present in Camap’s work, which merge, mainly in the Aufbau, with reduc-tionist aims. Thus, I intend to help to clarify to what extent Quine’s holism depends on a conventionalist position and to what extent conventionalism, in its turn, can get along with reductionist epistemological remains.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2003-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1484010.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 185-203Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 185-203Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 185-2031808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14840/13557Copyright (c) 2021 Sofia Inês Albornoz Steinhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessStein, Sofia Inês Albornoz2016-01-02T12:16:55Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14840Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:16:55Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine |
title |
Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine |
spellingShingle |
Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine Stein, Sofia Inês Albornoz |
title_short |
Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine |
title_full |
Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine |
title_fullStr |
Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine |
title_full_unstemmed |
Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine |
title_sort |
Aspectos convencionalistas da filosofia de Willard Quine |
author |
Stein, Sofia Inês Albornoz |
author_facet |
Stein, Sofia Inês Albornoz |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Stein, Sofia Inês Albornoz |
description |
One of the main contributions of philosophers at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century to philosophy of science and semantics was the thesis inspired in the scientific advances of natural and exact sciences, that there is not a single true theory of what goes on in the empirical world, but rather the possibility of constructing multiple versions, equally satisfac-tory, of an explanation of the world. In the Vienna Circle, more specifically, the conventionalist movement showed its influence primarily in the writings of Neurath, but also, more subtly, in the texts of Carnap. In this paper, I shall examine the theoretical relations between Quine’s holistic thesis and the conventionalist aspects of his work. In order to do this I will discuss Neurath’s holistic coherentism and of the conventionalist and holistic aspects present in Camap’s work, which merge, mainly in the Aufbau, with reduc-tionist aims. Thus, I intend to help to clarify to what extent Quine’s holism depends on a conventionalist position and to what extent conventionalism, in its turn, can get along with reductionist epistemological remains. |
publishDate |
2003 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2003-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14840 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14840 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14840/13557 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Sofia Inês Albornoz Stein http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Sofia Inês Albornoz Stein http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 185-203 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 185-203 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 185-203 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435110246842368 |