Induction and Natural Kinds

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Sankey, Howard
Data de Publicação: 1997
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18699
Resumo: The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principie of the uniformity of nature More speafically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of things, which are characterized as such by the essential properties which all members of a kind necessarily possess in common. The proposed response to inductive scepticism combines the insights of epistemic naturalism with a metaphysical outlook that is due to scientific realism.
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spelling Induction and Natural KindsThe paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principie of the uniformity of nature More speafically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of things, which are characterized as such by the essential properties which all members of a kind necessarily possess in common. The proposed response to inductive scepticism combines the insights of epistemic naturalism with a metaphysical outlook that is due to scientific realism.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC1997-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1869910.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 1 No. 2 (1997); 239-254Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 1 Núm. 2 (1997); 239-254Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 1 n. 2 (1997); 239-2541808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18699/17339Copyright (c) 2021 Howard Sankeyhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSankey, Howard2016-01-02T12:27:27Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/18699Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:27:27Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Induction and Natural Kinds
title Induction and Natural Kinds
spellingShingle Induction and Natural Kinds
Sankey, Howard
title_short Induction and Natural Kinds
title_full Induction and Natural Kinds
title_fullStr Induction and Natural Kinds
title_full_unstemmed Induction and Natural Kinds
title_sort Induction and Natural Kinds
author Sankey, Howard
author_facet Sankey, Howard
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Sankey, Howard
description The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principie of the uniformity of nature More speafically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of things, which are characterized as such by the essential properties which all members of a kind necessarily possess in common. The proposed response to inductive scepticism combines the insights of epistemic naturalism with a metaphysical outlook that is due to scientific realism.
publishDate 1997
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1997-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18699
10.5007/%x
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18699
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18699/17339
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Howard Sankey
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Howard Sankey
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 1 No. 2 (1997); 239-254
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 1 Núm. 2 (1997); 239-254
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 1 n. 2 (1997); 239-254
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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