Scientific Representation and Realism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ghins, Michel
Data de Publicação: 2011
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461
Resumo: After a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties to real targeted entities, called “ontic judgements”. I then present what van Fraassen calls “the Loss of Reality objection”. After criticizing his dissolution of the objection, I offer an alternative way of answering the Loss of Reality objection by showing that the contact of our models with reality is grounded on the truth of ontic judgements. I conclude by examining.
id UFSC-5_aff2c6c54085e9141cb77105af389871
oai_identifier_str oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/22912
network_acronym_str UFSC-5
network_name_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Scientific Representation and RealismScientific Representation and RealismAfter a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties to real targeted entities, called “ontic judgements”. I then present what van Fraassen calls “the Loss of Reality objection”. After criticizing his dissolution of the objection, I offer an alternative way of answering the Loss of Reality objection by showing that the contact of our models with reality is grounded on the truth of ontic judgements. I conclude by examining.Depois de uma breve apresentação do que considero ser a démarche representacional na ciência, enfatizo o papel fundamental, na construção de modelos, de juízos verdadeiros. O sucesso e a correção de uma representação baseiam-se na verdade de juízos que atribuem propriedades a entidades reais visadas, denominados “juízos ônticos”. Apresento então o que van Fraassen chama “a objeção da Perda de Realidade”. Depois de criticar sua dissolução dessa objeção, ofereço uma maneira alternativa de responder à objeção da Perda de Realidade mostrando que o contato de nossos modelos com a realidade é fundamentado na verdade de juízos ônticos. Concluo examinando a implicação dessa concepção para a questão do realismo científico.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2011-09-19info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p46110.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 No. 3 (2011); 461-474Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 Núm. 3 (2011); 461-474Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 15 n. 3 (2011); 461-4741808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461/22390Copyright (c) 2021 Michel Ghinsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGhins, Michel2019-09-12T11:36:50Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/22912Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T11:36:50Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Scientific Representation and Realism
Scientific Representation and Realism
title Scientific Representation and Realism
spellingShingle Scientific Representation and Realism
Ghins, Michel
title_short Scientific Representation and Realism
title_full Scientific Representation and Realism
title_fullStr Scientific Representation and Realism
title_full_unstemmed Scientific Representation and Realism
title_sort Scientific Representation and Realism
author Ghins, Michel
author_facet Ghins, Michel
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ghins, Michel
description After a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties to real targeted entities, called “ontic judgements”. I then present what van Fraassen calls “the Loss of Reality objection”. After criticizing his dissolution of the objection, I offer an alternative way of answering the Loss of Reality objection by showing that the contact of our models with reality is grounded on the truth of ontic judgements. I conclude by examining.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-09-19
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461
10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461/22390
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Michel Ghins
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Michel Ghins
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 No. 3 (2011); 461-474
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 Núm. 3 (2011); 461-474
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 15 n. 3 (2011); 461-474
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
_version_ 1789435111408664576

Registros relacionados