What makes a possible world physycally possible?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | spa |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
DOI: | 10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65 |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65 |
Resumo: | There is a widely extended viewpoint about physical possibility, what we will call Standard Approach, which holds that the physically possible is delimited by the nomological structure of physical theories: to be physically possible is to be in accordance with the physical laws, to be physically impossible is to be prohibited by physical laws and to be physically necessary is to be demanded by the physical laws. However, it is possible to show that this approach is too relaxed and permissive when it comes to collecting and systematizing many of the modal intuitions present in the physical community. In this work we will argue, on the one hand, that the notion of physical possibility is more complex and richer than suggested by the standard approach and, on the other hand, that it is necessary to add some extra elements to the characterization of physical possibility in order to that it is adequate in scientific contexts. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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What makes a possible world physycally possible?¿Qué hace físicamente posible a un mundo posible?¿Qué hace físicamente posible a un mundo posible?There is a widely extended viewpoint about physical possibility, what we will call Standard Approach, which holds that the physically possible is delimited by the nomological structure of physical theories: to be physically possible is to be in accordance with the physical laws, to be physically impossible is to be prohibited by physical laws and to be physically necessary is to be demanded by the physical laws. However, it is possible to show that this approach is too relaxed and permissive when it comes to collecting and systematizing many of the modal intuitions present in the physical community. In this work we will argue, on the one hand, that the notion of physical possibility is more complex and richer than suggested by the standard approach and, on the other hand, that it is necessary to add some extra elements to the characterization of physical possibility in order to that it is adequate in scientific contexts.Existe un enfoque ampliamente extendido, que denominaremos Enfoque Estándar, que sostiene que lo físicamente posible está delimitado por la estructura nomológica de las teorías físicas. Sin embargo, este enfoque resulta ser demasiado relajado y permisivo para recoger y sistematizar muchas de las intuiciones modales presentes en la comunidad física. En este trabajo argumentaremos que la noción de posibilidad física es más compleja y rica que lo sugerido por el Enfoque Estándar y; además, que es necesario adicionar algunos elementos extras a la caracterización de posibilidad física para que esta resulte adecuada en contextos científicos.There is a widely extended viewpoint about physical possibility, what we will call Standard Approach, which holds that the physically possible is delimited by the nomological structure of physical theories: to be physically possible is to be in accordance with the physical laws, to be physically impossible is to be prohibited by physical laws and to be physically necessary is to be demanded by the physical laws. However, it is possible to show that this approach is too relaxed and permissive when it comes to collecting and systematizing many of the modal intuitions present in the physical community. In this work we will argue, on the one hand, that the notion of physical possibility is more complex and richer than suggested by the standard approach and, on the other hand, that it is necessary to add some extra elements to the characterization of physical possibility in order to that it is adequate in scientific contexts.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2020-04-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2020v24n1p6510.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 24 No. 1 (2020); 65-88Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 24 Núm. 1 (2020); 65-88Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 24 n. 1 (2020); 65-881808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65/pdf_1Copyright (c) 2021 Manuel Jesús Herrera Aros, Cristián Ariel Lópezinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHerrera Aros, Manuel JesúsLópez, Cristián Ariel2020-04-29T10:11:20Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/61607Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2020-04-29T10:11:20Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
What makes a possible world physycally possible? ¿Qué hace físicamente posible a un mundo posible? ¿Qué hace físicamente posible a un mundo posible? |
title |
What makes a possible world physycally possible? |
spellingShingle |
What makes a possible world physycally possible? What makes a possible world physycally possible? Herrera Aros, Manuel Jesús Herrera Aros, Manuel Jesús |
title_short |
What makes a possible world physycally possible? |
title_full |
What makes a possible world physycally possible? |
title_fullStr |
What makes a possible world physycally possible? What makes a possible world physycally possible? |
title_full_unstemmed |
What makes a possible world physycally possible? What makes a possible world physycally possible? |
title_sort |
What makes a possible world physycally possible? |
author |
Herrera Aros, Manuel Jesús |
author_facet |
Herrera Aros, Manuel Jesús Herrera Aros, Manuel Jesús López, Cristián Ariel López, Cristián Ariel |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
López, Cristián Ariel |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Herrera Aros, Manuel Jesús López, Cristián Ariel |
description |
There is a widely extended viewpoint about physical possibility, what we will call Standard Approach, which holds that the physically possible is delimited by the nomological structure of physical theories: to be physically possible is to be in accordance with the physical laws, to be physically impossible is to be prohibited by physical laws and to be physically necessary is to be demanded by the physical laws. However, it is possible to show that this approach is too relaxed and permissive when it comes to collecting and systematizing many of the modal intuitions present in the physical community. In this work we will argue, on the one hand, that the notion of physical possibility is more complex and richer than suggested by the standard approach and, on the other hand, that it is necessary to add some extra elements to the characterization of physical possibility in order to that it is adequate in scientific contexts. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-04-28 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65 10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65/pdf_1 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Manuel Jesús Herrera Aros, Cristián Ariel López info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Manuel Jesús Herrera Aros, Cristián Ariel López |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 24 No. 1 (2020); 65-88 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 24 Núm. 1 (2020); 65-88 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 24 n. 1 (2020); 65-88 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1822181383234125824 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p65 |