Identifying Knowledge and Communication
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14508 |
Resumo: | In this paper, I discuss how the principle of identifying knowledge which Strawson advances in ‘Singular Terms and Predication’ (1961), and in ‘Identifying Reference and Truth-Values’ (1964) turns out to constrain communication.The principle states that a speaker’s use of a referring expression should invoke identifying knowledge on the part of the hearer, if the hearer is to understand what the speaker is saying, and also that, in so referring, speakers are attentive to hearers’ epistemic states. In contrasting it with Russell’s Principle (Evans 1982), as well as with the principle of identifying descriptions (Donnellan 1970), I try to show that the principle of identifying knowledge, ultimately a condition for understanding, makes sense only in a situation ofconversation. This allows me to conclude that the cooperative feature of communication (Grice 1975) and reference (Clark andWilkes-Gibbs 1986) holds also at the understanding level. Finally, I discuss where Strawson’s views seem to be unsatisfactory, and suggest how they might be improved. |
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Identifying Knowledge and CommunicationIn this paper, I discuss how the principle of identifying knowledge which Strawson advances in ‘Singular Terms and Predication’ (1961), and in ‘Identifying Reference and Truth-Values’ (1964) turns out to constrain communication.The principle states that a speaker’s use of a referring expression should invoke identifying knowledge on the part of the hearer, if the hearer is to understand what the speaker is saying, and also that, in so referring, speakers are attentive to hearers’ epistemic states. In contrasting it with Russell’s Principle (Evans 1982), as well as with the principle of identifying descriptions (Donnellan 1970), I try to show that the principle of identifying knowledge, ultimately a condition for understanding, makes sense only in a situation ofconversation. This allows me to conclude that the cooperative feature of communication (Grice 1975) and reference (Clark andWilkes-Gibbs 1986) holds also at the understanding level. Finally, I discuss where Strawson’s views seem to be unsatisfactory, and suggest how they might be improved.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2006-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1450810.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 10 No. 2 (2006); 125-141Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 10 Núm. 2 (2006); 125-141Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 10 n. 2 (2006); 125-1411808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCengporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14508/13286https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14508/18023Copyright (c) 2021 Eduardo Coutinho Lourenço de Limahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessde Lima, Eduardo Coutinho Lourenço2016-01-02T12:14:41Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14508Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:14:41Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Identifying Knowledge and Communication |
title |
Identifying Knowledge and Communication |
spellingShingle |
Identifying Knowledge and Communication de Lima, Eduardo Coutinho Lourenço |
title_short |
Identifying Knowledge and Communication |
title_full |
Identifying Knowledge and Communication |
title_fullStr |
Identifying Knowledge and Communication |
title_full_unstemmed |
Identifying Knowledge and Communication |
title_sort |
Identifying Knowledge and Communication |
author |
de Lima, Eduardo Coutinho Lourenço |
author_facet |
de Lima, Eduardo Coutinho Lourenço |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
de Lima, Eduardo Coutinho Lourenço |
description |
In this paper, I discuss how the principle of identifying knowledge which Strawson advances in ‘Singular Terms and Predication’ (1961), and in ‘Identifying Reference and Truth-Values’ (1964) turns out to constrain communication.The principle states that a speaker’s use of a referring expression should invoke identifying knowledge on the part of the hearer, if the hearer is to understand what the speaker is saying, and also that, in so referring, speakers are attentive to hearers’ epistemic states. In contrasting it with Russell’s Principle (Evans 1982), as well as with the principle of identifying descriptions (Donnellan 1970), I try to show that the principle of identifying knowledge, ultimately a condition for understanding, makes sense only in a situation ofconversation. This allows me to conclude that the cooperative feature of communication (Grice 1975) and reference (Clark andWilkes-Gibbs 1986) holds also at the understanding level. Finally, I discuss where Strawson’s views seem to be unsatisfactory, and suggest how they might be improved. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2006-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14508 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14508 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng por |
language |
eng por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14508/13286 https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14508/18023 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Eduardo Coutinho Lourenço de Lima http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Eduardo Coutinho Lourenço de Lima http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 10 No. 2 (2006); 125-141 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 10 Núm. 2 (2006); 125-141 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 10 n. 2 (2006); 125-141 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435108906762240 |