Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Valcarenghi, Emerson Carlos
Data de Publicação: 2010
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175
Resumo: In this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S, genuinely defeats the justification of p to S. Swain postulates that, to any Gettier-type counterexample, there is a true proposition which, when associated with the set of reasons-R of S, ultimately defeats the justification of S to believe p. To show that Klein an Swain proposals do not resolve that problem, this essay presents two Gettier-type counterexamples for which there are no genuine defeaters of justification of p by e to S and there are no defeaters not ultimately defeated of the justification of the belief of S that p by R. After doing that, we try to show that the obtained conclusion regarding Klein and Swain defeasibility theories can be extended to any defeasibility theory of knowledge.
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spelling Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de GettierOs anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de GettierIn this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S, genuinely defeats the justification of p to S. Swain postulates that, to any Gettier-type counterexample, there is a true proposition which, when associated with the set of reasons-R of S, ultimately defeats the justification of S to believe p. To show that Klein an Swain proposals do not resolve that problem, this essay presents two Gettier-type counterexamples for which there are no genuine defeaters of justification of p by e to S and there are no defeaters not ultimately defeated of the justification of the belief of S that p by R. After doing that, we try to show that the obtained conclusion regarding Klein and Swain defeasibility theories can be extended to any defeasibility theory of knowledge.Nós tentamos mostrar neste ensaio que as propostas anulabilistas de Peter Klein e de Marshall Swain não resolvem o problema de Gettier. Klein postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com a evidência e de S, anula de modo legítimo a justificação de p para S. Swain postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com o conjunto de razões R de S, anula de modo ulterior a justificação de S para crer que p. Para provarmos que essas propostas não resolvem aquele problema, apresentamos dois contra-exemplos de tipo-Gettier para os quais não há anuladores legítimos da justificação de p por e para S, nem anuladores da justificação da crença de S de que p por R que não sejam ulteriormente anulados. Após a discussão em torno dos anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain, tentamos mostrar que as conclusões nela obtidas podem ser corretamente aplicadas a qualquer proposta anulabilista de conhecimento.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2010-05-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p17510.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 No. 2 (2010); 175-200Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 Núm. 2 (2010); 175-200Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 14 n. 2 (2010); 175-2001808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175/17950Copyright (c) 2021 Emerson Carlos Valcarenghiinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessValcarenghi, Emerson Carlos2020-01-22T08:50:26Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/19650Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2020-01-22T08:50:26Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
title Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
spellingShingle Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
Valcarenghi, Emerson Carlos
title_short Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
title_full Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
title_fullStr Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
title_full_unstemmed Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
title_sort Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
author Valcarenghi, Emerson Carlos
author_facet Valcarenghi, Emerson Carlos
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Valcarenghi, Emerson Carlos
description In this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S, genuinely defeats the justification of p to S. Swain postulates that, to any Gettier-type counterexample, there is a true proposition which, when associated with the set of reasons-R of S, ultimately defeats the justification of S to believe p. To show that Klein an Swain proposals do not resolve that problem, this essay presents two Gettier-type counterexamples for which there are no genuine defeaters of justification of p by e to S and there are no defeaters not ultimately defeated of the justification of the belief of S that p by R. After doing that, we try to show that the obtained conclusion regarding Klein and Swain defeasibility theories can be extended to any defeasibility theory of knowledge.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-05-22
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175
10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175/17950
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 No. 2 (2010); 175-200
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 Núm. 2 (2010); 175-200
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 14 n. 2 (2010); 175-200
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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