Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Caponi, Gustavo
Data de Publicação: 2009
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29
Resumo: Having as starting point that a proximal cause is one which effects can be registered in the states of an individual organism, in this work I will argue that what defines anultimate cause is the fact that its effects can be registered in the evolution of lineages, and not simply in population states. This, on the other hand, not only will allow us to clarify how thedevelopmental constraints can be understood as causes of the evolutionary phenomena; but also it will allow us to point the eminently historical character of Developmental EvolutionaryBiology that Wallace Arthur lessened in Biased Embryos and Evolution. Thus, and following this latter reasoning, I will also try to show that, although the action of developmental constraints could happen beyond the limits of a population or a particular species, that does not imply that we are before a comeback of typological thought in Evolutionary Biology.
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spelling Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia naturalDesarrollo, causas remotas e historia naturalHaving as starting point that a proximal cause is one which effects can be registered in the states of an individual organism, in this work I will argue that what defines anultimate cause is the fact that its effects can be registered in the evolution of lineages, and not simply in population states. This, on the other hand, not only will allow us to clarify how thedevelopmental constraints can be understood as causes of the evolutionary phenomena; but also it will allow us to point the eminently historical character of Developmental EvolutionaryBiology that Wallace Arthur lessened in Biased Embryos and Evolution. Thus, and following this latter reasoning, I will also try to show that, although the action of developmental constraints could happen beyond the limits of a population or a particular species, that does not imply that we are before a comeback of typological thought in Evolutionary Biology.Partindo da premisa de que uma causa próxima é aquela cujos efeitos podem ser registrados nos estados de um organismo individual, sustentarei neste trabalho que o que define uma causa remota é o fato de que seus efeitos possam ser registrados na evolução de linhagens, e não simplesmente em estados populacionais. Isso, por outra parte, não somente nos permitirá entender em que sentido as restrições ontogenéticas devem ser comprendidas como causas remotas dos fenômenos evolutivos; mas também nos permitirá colocar em evidência o caráter eminentemente histórico da biologia evolucionaria do desenvolvimento que Wallace Arthur menoscabou em Biased Embryos and Evolution. Assim, e seguindo esta última linha de raciocínio, também procurarei mostrar que, ainda que a ação dessas ditas restrições ontogenéticas possa verificar-se além dos limites de uma população ou espécie particular, isso não implica que estejamos assistindo a um retorno do pensamento tipológico na biologia evolucionária.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2009-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n1p2910.5007/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 13 No. 1 (2009); 29-50Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 13 Núm. 1 (2009); 29-50Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 13 n. 1 (2009); 29-501808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCengporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29/12748https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29/18050Copyright (c) 2021 Gustavo Caponiinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCaponi, Gustavo2019-09-12T10:20:39Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/13900Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T10:20:39Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
title Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
spellingShingle Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
Caponi, Gustavo
title_short Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
title_full Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
title_fullStr Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
title_full_unstemmed Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
title_sort Desarrollo, causas remotas e historia natural
author Caponi, Gustavo
author_facet Caponi, Gustavo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Caponi, Gustavo
description Having as starting point that a proximal cause is one which effects can be registered in the states of an individual organism, in this work I will argue that what defines anultimate cause is the fact that its effects can be registered in the evolution of lineages, and not simply in population states. This, on the other hand, not only will allow us to clarify how thedevelopmental constraints can be understood as causes of the evolutionary phenomena; but also it will allow us to point the eminently historical character of Developmental EvolutionaryBiology that Wallace Arthur lessened in Biased Embryos and Evolution. Thus, and following this latter reasoning, I will also try to show that, although the action of developmental constraints could happen beyond the limits of a population or a particular species, that does not imply that we are before a comeback of typological thought in Evolutionary Biology.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009-01-01
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29
10.5007/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
por
language eng
por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29/12748
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n1p29/18050
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Gustavo Caponi
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Gustavo Caponi
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 13 No. 1 (2009); 29-50
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 13 Núm. 1 (2009); 29-50
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 13 n. 1 (2009); 29-50
1808-1711
1414-4247
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reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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