Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico
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Data de Publicação: | 2014 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361 |
Resumo: | In this paper I present a proposal to reformulate the argument of Alvin Plantinga (2011) against metaphysical naturalism. Contrary to Plantinga’s argument, in this new version I propose to consider the probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties, not with regard to any kind of beliefs, but only with respect to metaphysical beliefs. I claim that those who accept naturalism have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs and, thus, they have a defeater for any of their metaphysical beliefs, including the belief in metaphysical naturalism. Therefore, those who accept naturalism have a defeater for naturalism; in other words, metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating. |
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Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísicoProposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísicoIn this paper I present a proposal to reformulate the argument of Alvin Plantinga (2011) against metaphysical naturalism. Contrary to Plantinga’s argument, in this new version I propose to consider the probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties, not with regard to any kind of beliefs, but only with respect to metaphysical beliefs. I claim that those who accept naturalism have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs and, thus, they have a defeater for any of their metaphysical beliefs, including the belief in metaphysical naturalism. Therefore, those who accept naturalism have a defeater for naturalism; in other words, metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating.Neste artigo proponho uma reformulação do argumento de Alvin Plantinga (2011) contra o naturalismo metafísico. Ao contrário do argumento de Plantinga, nesta nova versão proponho considerar a probabilidade da fiabilidade das faculdades cognitivas, não em relação a todo o tipo de crenças, mas apenas em relação a crenças metafísicas. Argumento que quem aceita o naturalismo tem um anulador para a crença de que as suas faculdades cognitivas são fiáveis com respeito a crenças metafísicas e, por conseguinte, tem um anulador para qualquer uma das suas crenças metafísicas, inclusive para a sua crença no naturalismo metafísico. Assim, quem aceita o naturalismo tem um anulador para o naturalismo; ou seja, o naturalismo metafísico é autoderrotante.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2014-12-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n3p36110.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 18 No. 3 (2014); 361-370Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 18 Núm. 3 (2014); 361-370Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 18 n. 3 (2014); 361-3701808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361/29899Copyright (c) 2021 Domingos Fariainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFaria, Domingos2019-09-13T10:14:27Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/36631Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T10:14:27Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico |
title |
Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico |
spellingShingle |
Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico Faria, Domingos |
title_short |
Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico |
title_full |
Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico |
title_fullStr |
Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico |
title_full_unstemmed |
Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico |
title_sort |
Proposta de argumento contra o naturalismo metafísico |
author |
Faria, Domingos |
author_facet |
Faria, Domingos |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Faria, Domingos |
description |
In this paper I present a proposal to reformulate the argument of Alvin Plantinga (2011) against metaphysical naturalism. Contrary to Plantinga’s argument, in this new version I propose to consider the probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties, not with regard to any kind of beliefs, but only with respect to metaphysical beliefs. I claim that those who accept naturalism have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs and, thus, they have a defeater for any of their metaphysical beliefs, including the belief in metaphysical naturalism. Therefore, those who accept naturalism have a defeater for naturalism; in other words, metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-12-12 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361 10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361/29899 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Domingos Faria info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Domingos Faria |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 18 No. 3 (2014); 361-370 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 18 Núm. 3 (2014); 361-370 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 18 n. 3 (2014); 361-370 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435112551612416 |