Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387 |
Resumo: | The laws of nature are central to our understanding of the world. And while there is often broad agreement about the technical formulations of the laws, there can be sharp disagreement about the metaphysical nature of the laws. For instance, the Newtonian laws of nature can be stated and analyzed by appealing to a set of possible worlds. Yet, some philosophers argue the worlds are mere notational devices, while others take them to be robust, concrete entities in their own right. In this paper, I use a recent view of laws called the Mentaculus as a case study to illustrate the wide variety of metaphysical pictures that can accompany such a view. I conclude that the technical features of the laws -- typically (though not always) given to us by practicing scientists -- are compatible with many different metaphysical foundations. |
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Mentaculus Laws and MetaphysicsMentaculus Laws and MetaphysicsThe laws of nature are central to our understanding of the world. And while there is often broad agreement about the technical formulations of the laws, there can be sharp disagreement about the metaphysical nature of the laws. For instance, the Newtonian laws of nature can be stated and analyzed by appealing to a set of possible worlds. Yet, some philosophers argue the worlds are mere notational devices, while others take them to be robust, concrete entities in their own right. In this paper, I use a recent view of laws called the Mentaculus as a case study to illustrate the wide variety of metaphysical pictures that can accompany such a view. I conclude that the technical features of the laws -- typically (though not always) given to us by practicing scientists -- are compatible with many different metaphysical foundations. The laws of nature are central to our understanding of the world. And while there is often broad agreement about the technical formulations of the laws, there can be sharp disagreement about the metaphysical nature of the laws. For instance, the Newtonian laws of nature can be stated and analyzed by appealing to a set of possible worlds. Yet, some philosophers argue the worlds are mere notational devices, while others take them to be robust, concrete entities in their own right. In this paper, I use a recent view of laws called the Mentaculus as a case study to illustrate the wide variety of metaphysical pictures that can accompany such a view. I conclude that the technical features of the laws — typically (though not always) given to us by practicing scientists—are compatible with many different metaphysical foundations.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2019-12-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p38710.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 3 (2019); 387-399Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 3 (2019); 387-399Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 3 (2019); 387-3991808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Heather Demarestinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDemarest, Heather2020-04-14T11:40:52Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/70053Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2020-04-14T11:40:52Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics |
title |
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics |
spellingShingle |
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics Demarest, Heather |
title_short |
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics |
title_full |
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics |
title_fullStr |
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics |
title_full_unstemmed |
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics |
title_sort |
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics |
author |
Demarest, Heather |
author_facet |
Demarest, Heather |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Demarest, Heather |
description |
The laws of nature are central to our understanding of the world. And while there is often broad agreement about the technical formulations of the laws, there can be sharp disagreement about the metaphysical nature of the laws. For instance, the Newtonian laws of nature can be stated and analyzed by appealing to a set of possible worlds. Yet, some philosophers argue the worlds are mere notational devices, while others take them to be robust, concrete entities in their own right. In this paper, I use a recent view of laws called the Mentaculus as a case study to illustrate the wide variety of metaphysical pictures that can accompany such a view. I conclude that the technical features of the laws -- typically (though not always) given to us by practicing scientists -- are compatible with many different metaphysical foundations. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-12-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387 10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387/pdf |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Heather Demarest info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Heather Demarest |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 3 (2019); 387-399 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 3 (2019); 387-399 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 3 (2019); 387-399 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435108791418880 |