Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Demarest, Heather
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387
Resumo: The laws of nature are central to our understanding of the world. And while there is often broad agreement about the technical formulations of the laws, there can be sharp disagreement about the metaphysical nature of the laws. For instance, the Newtonian laws of nature can be stated and analyzed by appealing to a set of possible worlds. Yet, some philosophers argue the worlds are mere notational devices, while others take them to be robust, concrete entities in their own right. In this paper, I use a recent view of laws called the Mentaculus as a case study to illustrate the wide variety of metaphysical pictures that can accompany such a view. I conclude that the technical features of the laws -- typically (though not always) given to us by practicing scientists -- are compatible with many different metaphysical foundations.
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spelling Mentaculus Laws and MetaphysicsMentaculus Laws and MetaphysicsThe laws of nature are central to our understanding of the world. And while there is often broad agreement about the technical formulations of the laws, there can be sharp disagreement about the metaphysical nature of the laws. For instance, the Newtonian laws of nature can be stated and analyzed by appealing to a set of possible worlds. Yet, some philosophers argue the worlds are mere notational devices, while others take them to be robust, concrete entities in their own right. In this paper, I use a recent view of laws called the Mentaculus as a case study to illustrate the wide variety of metaphysical pictures that can accompany such a view. I conclude that the technical features of the laws -- typically (though not always) given to us by practicing scientists -- are compatible with many different metaphysical foundations. The laws of nature are central to our understanding of the world. And while there is often broad agreement about the technical formulations of the laws, there can be sharp disagreement about the metaphysical nature of the laws. For instance, the Newtonian laws of nature can be stated and analyzed by appealing to a set of possible worlds. Yet, some philosophers argue the worlds are mere notational devices, while others take them to be robust, concrete entities in their own right. In this paper, I use a recent view of laws called the Mentaculus as a case study to illustrate the wide variety of metaphysical pictures that can accompany such a view. I conclude that the technical features of the laws — typically (though not always) given to us by practicing scientists—are compatible with many different metaphysical foundations.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2019-12-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p38710.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 3 (2019); 387-399Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 3 (2019); 387-399Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 3 (2019); 387-3991808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Heather Demarestinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDemarest, Heather2020-04-14T11:40:52Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/70053Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2020-04-14T11:40:52Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
title Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
spellingShingle Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
Demarest, Heather
title_short Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
title_full Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
title_fullStr Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
title_full_unstemmed Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
title_sort Mentaculus Laws and Metaphysics
author Demarest, Heather
author_facet Demarest, Heather
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Demarest, Heather
description The laws of nature are central to our understanding of the world. And while there is often broad agreement about the technical formulations of the laws, there can be sharp disagreement about the metaphysical nature of the laws. For instance, the Newtonian laws of nature can be stated and analyzed by appealing to a set of possible worlds. Yet, some philosophers argue the worlds are mere notational devices, while others take them to be robust, concrete entities in their own right. In this paper, I use a recent view of laws called the Mentaculus as a case study to illustrate the wide variety of metaphysical pictures that can accompany such a view. I conclude that the technical features of the laws -- typically (though not always) given to us by practicing scientists -- are compatible with many different metaphysical foundations.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-12-31
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387
10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n3p387/pdf
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Heather Demarest
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Heather Demarest
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 3 (2019); 387-399
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 3 (2019); 387-399
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 3 (2019); 387-399
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
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reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
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